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IN MEMORIAM

RAY GARRETT, JR.
AUGUST 11, 1920 - FEBRUARY 3, 1980

With the death of Ray Garrett, Jr. on February 3, 1980, the
accounting profession lost one of its more creative and dedicated
advisers.
As a member and vice chairman of the Public Oversight Board
of the SEC Practice Section for the past two years, Mr. Garrett was in
the vanguard of the profession— making his manifold talents available
in helping to resolve many of the substantive issues confronting the
accounting profession's installations of a self-regulatory program.
His experience as a
chairman of the Securities and
provide invaluable guidance to
views and recommendations were
and Exchange Commission, this
profession.

member of the staff and later as
Exchange Commission permitted him to
this Board and to the profession. His
given great weight by the Securities
Board and leaders of the accounting

The Board wishes to record its recognition of the many
contributions Ray Garrett made to it during its formative period as
well as to express its deep sense of personal loss at the passing of a
colleague of such character and capacity.
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March 31, 1980
To Member Firms of the SEC Practice Section,
The Securities and Exchange Commission and
Other Interested Persons
Attached hereto is the second annual report of
the Public Oversight Board covering its activities for
the twelve months ended March 31, 1980.
The Board was saddened by the death of its Vice
Chairman, Ray Garrett, Jr., on February 3, 1980, and the
Board's tribute to him is included in the report.
During the Board's second year, the Executive
Committee of the SEC Practice Section adopted procedures
for dealing with alleged or possible audit failures of
SEC clients involving member firms and established a
permanent Special Investigations Committee to carry out
such procedures. Copies of relevant documents are
annexed to the Board's annual report. This important
step was taken at the suggestion of the Board and
involved extensive discussion and consultation between
the Board and the Executive Committee. The Board
believes that a reasonable self-policing mechanism has
been developed. The next few years will provide the
opportunity to test and improve these procedures. The
Board regards effective implementation of the Section's
investigative and monitoring procedures to be essential
features of the Section's self-regulatory program and
intends to give particular attention to monitoring these
procedures and to offer comments from time to time as
appropriate.
This past year has seen an increase in peer review
activity. The peer review process and the Board's
monitoring program have been improved through experience
with 40 peer reviews. Discussions were held with the
SEC's staff regarding its access to peer review papers,
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and progress was made with respect to the international
aspects of peer reviews. The next year will see a sharp
increase in peer reviews with 200 firms scheduled for
initial reviews. This will provide the opportunity for
further improvement in the peer review program of the
Section and the Board.
The Section also studied the auditor's work
environment in relation to possible substandard auditing
as noted by the Cohen Commission. A position paper
prepared by the Section's special task force on this
topic, which is annexed to the Board's annual report,
contains some practical observations and suggestions
for firms in dealing with the problem should it exist.
The Board continues to be concerned that the
Section's membership does not include all firms that
audit SEC clients, although the percentage of SEC clients
audited by member firms is very high. The Board has urged
the Section to continue its efforts to increase its
membership to the greatest possible extent. Among other
things, the Board would favor the imposition by the SEC
of a requirement that SEC registrants disclose in their
proxy statements whether their auditing firms are members
of the Section.
The Board believes that progress made during the
past year is evidence of the continued strong commitment
of the Section to the success of its self-regulatory
program. The Board noted with appreciation that the SEC
continues to be supportive with its constructive criticism
and comments. The Section will face many challenges in
1980-1981 to make its program more effective. The Board
believes, however, that the experience thus far gained,
together with the continued encouragement and support
of the SEC, will enable the profession to make continued
progress in 1980 and the years ahead.
PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD

John J. McCloy
Chairman
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Public Oversight Board
SEC PRACTICE SECTION
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants

ANNUAL REPORT
1979-1980
This second annual report of the Public Oversight Board
("Board") of the SEC Practice Section ("Section") of the Division
for CPA Firms of the American Institute of Certified Public Accoun
tants ("AICPA") covers its activities for the period April 1, 1979
through March 31, 1980.
I.

PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD

The responsibilities and functions of the Board were not
changed during the year.
Its primary responsibilities are to (1)
monitor and evaluate the performance of the Section's Peer Review,
Special Investigations and Executive Committees, with special
emphasis on the regulatory and sanction activities; (2) see that
the Peer Review Committee is taking the necessary steps to ensure
appropriate action on the part of member firms as a result of peer
reviews; (3) make recommendations for improvement in the operation
of the Section; and (4) publish an annual report and such other
reports as may be deemed desirable with respect to its activities.
The Board does not have line authority or responsibility; it acts
purely in an oversight and advisory capacity.
A.
month.

Meetings and Other Activities
The Board normally meets on the third Tuesday of each
During the past year, ten such monthly meetings were held.

Major items considered by the Board and commented on in
detail in subsequent sections of this report are (1) the peer
review program, (2) the procedures for investigation of alleged or
possible audit failures,
(3) a study of the auditor's work
environment, (4) the scope of services provided by CPA firms, and
(5) membership in the Section.
At each meeting, the Board receives a report from its
Executive Director on the recent activities of the Peer Review
Committee and the Executive Committee.
A Board staff member
attends all meetings of these committees as well as meetings of
several of their subcommittees and task forces.
In addition, Board members and staff met on several occa
sions with certain of the commissioners and staff of the Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC").
The Board also submitted briefs
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and comments
CPA firms.
August 1-2,
Governmental
B.

to the SEC on matters relating to scope of services by
Board Vice-Chairman Garrett offered testimony at the
1979, hearing conducted by the Senate Subcommittee on
Efficiency and the District of Columbia.

Composition of the Board

John J. McCloy continued as Chairman and Ray Garrett, Jr.
continued as Vice-Chairman of the Board until his untimely death on
February 3, 1980.
John D. Harper and Arthur M. Wood whose initial
terms expired
on December 31, 1979 were elected for
additional
three-year terms.
Additional details are shown in Exhibit I of
this report.
Annual Board
remuneration continued at $30,000 per
member, $40,000 for the Vice-Chairman and $50,000 for the Chairman.
In connection with work of the Board, each member is
authorized torecruit staff assistance available
in his office.
Mr. McCloy designated Mr. Richard A. Stark, a partner in the New
York law firm
of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, as counsel for
this purpose.
Mr. Stark is also Secretary for the Board. Mr.
Charles R. Manzoni, Jr., a partner in the Chicago law firm of
Gardner, Carton & Douglas, served as counsel to Mr. Garrett.
C.

Staff and Expenses

The Board employs full-time executive and technical
directors.
Louis W. Matusiak has served as the Executive Director
since May 1, 1978. Stuart Newman served as Technical Director from
February 1, 1979, until his untimely death in December.
On
February 1, 1980,
Charles J. Evers joined the staff as Technical
Director.
Immediately prior to joining the POB staff, Mr. Evers
served for over two years as a member of the senior staff of the
Financial Accounting Standards Board.
He has extensive public
accounting experience, including six years as an audit partner with
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
Because the number of peer reviews
scheduled for 1980 exceeds 200, the Board at its March 1980 meeting
authorized
the addition of another
full-time member
to its
technical staff.
All expenses of the Board and its staff are paid from
membership dues of the Section.
For accounting convenience, the
Board reports its expenses on the same fiscal year basis used by the
AICPA.
The estimated expenses for the fiscal year ending July 31,
1980, are $652,000.
Additional details are shown in Exhibit II.
II.

PEER REVIEW PROGRAM

A major responsibility of the Board is to monitor and
evaluate the activities of the Peer Review Committee ("Committee"),
the peer reviews of member firms, and the actions taken by the
Section with respect to peer reviews.
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A.

Peer Review Committee

The peer review program is administered by the Committee
which consists of fifteen individuals appointed from member firms
by the Executive Committee.
Since its inception, the Committee has
been under the leadership of Donald L. Neebes, a partner in Ernst &
Whinney, whose term expires in 1980.
The Executive Committee has
appointed Joseph X. Loftus, a partner in Price Waterhouse & Co., as
Vice-Chairman, and he will succeed Mr. Neebes as Chairman in
October 1980.
Committee members' time commitments have been consid
erable.
The Committee held 10 meetings during the past year for a
total of 19 days.
In addition, Committee members are involved in
subcommittee and task force meetings, oversight of specific peer
reviews, and a number of special projects.
As noted in its 1978-79 Annual Report, the Board is aware
that concerns have been expressed about a dominant representation
of the larger firms on the Committee.
Appointments to the Com
mittee have been declined by several members of smaller firms,
primarily because of the significant time commitment required. The
Board is mindful of the need for Committee members to be a represen
tative cross-section of larger and smaller firms and for the
Committee to give appropriate consideration to the nature of
practice of smaller firms in decisions that affect such firms.
To
date, the Board believes that the Executive and Peer Review
Committees have given appropriate consideration to the nature of
practice in a smaller firm.
1.

Administration of Peer Reviews

In the interest of increasing the number of firms partic
ipating in the Section's program, the Committee has authorized the
Private Companies Practice Section Peer Review Committee ("PCPSPRC") and associations of CPA firms to administer certain aspects
of the peer review program in compliance with the Committee's
standards.
However, the Committee has the sole responsibility for
accepting and placing in the public file reports and letters of
comments for all member firms of the Section.
Further, the
Committee Chairman may reject the review team or Quality Control
Review Panel ("Panel") appointments of the PCPS-PRC.
For association-administered reviews, the Committee must
approve each association's administrative plan and assigns a Panel
for each such review.
If an association has a common quality
control element, that particular element must be reviewed by a team
or firm that is independent of the association.

3

a.

Summary of 1978 and 1979 Reviews

Fifty-one member firms have had their initial peer review
under the Section's program:
11 1/ in 1978 and 40 in 1979.
The
firms reviewed vary widely in size, ranging from sole proprietor
ships to national firms.
An indication of size of the firms
reviewed and the extent of coverage of SEC clients is as follows:
Size of Firm
(by number of SEC Clients)

_____ Number of______
Firms
SEC Clients

None
1 to 4
5 to 29
30 or more

Total number of SEC clients
audited by member firms
Percentage of SEC clients
audited by member firms
which had a review in
1978 or 1979

32
8
4
7

0
12
48
5,177

51

5,237
8,880

59%

Of the 40 peer reviews conducted in 1979, 34 were conducted
by committee-appointed review teams, 5 by another member firm, and
one by an association.
The Standards for Performing and Reporting on Quality
Control Compliance Reviews provide that the review team ordinarily
furnish the reviewed firm with a letter of comments, which is
placed along with the report in the public files, informing the
reviewed firm of matters that the review team believes may require
action.
The Committee continued its practice of considering each
report issued on a peer review together with the related letter of
comments and the reviewed firm's response to determine whether
further action was required, including whether it should recommend
the imposition of sanctions to the Executive Committee.

1/

Includes a firm that had a voluntary review and a subsequent
review conducted under the auspices of the SEC.
The Committee
accepted these reviews as meeting the peer review membership
requirement of the Section.
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As of the date of this report,
the Committee has
considered and accepted the report, letter of comments, if issued,
and the related response on only 21 of the forty 1979 reviews. The
Committee has not been able to take action on the remaining 19
reviews
because
the report,
letter,
response,
or
reviewers'
workpapers have not all been submitted to the Committee for action.
The
21 accepted
reports consist of 18 unqualified
reports, 2 modified reports and 1 adverse report.
One report was
modified because the reviewed firm did not comply with the minimum
professional liability insurance required by member firms.
The
second modified report cited lack of compliance with the minimum
professional
liability
insurance
as
well
as
documentation
deficiencies in a few functional areas of the firm's quality
control system.
The adverse report was due to the reviewed firm's
general failure to comply with its stated system of quality control
as applied to its accounting and auditing practice.
After placing the adverse report and attendant letter of
comments and response in the public file, the Committee conferred
with the reviewed firm (a sole practitioner) and suggested a
remedial course of action.
Three months later, in March 1980, the
Committee reviewed the progress made by the firm in correcting the
deficiencies noted and will recommend to the Executive Committee
that this firm be continued as a member but require the firm to
undergo another peer review in 1980.
The firm has shown serious
intent to improve its practice and has indicated its willingness to
have its quality control system reviewed again in 1980.
There are preliminary indications that approximately
seven additional reports, on the 19 reviews not yet processed by
the Committee, will be modified.
The results of peer reviews are discussed at meetings
with the Chairmen of the AICPA Quality Control Standards Committee,
Auditing Standards Board, Accounting and Review Services Committee
and the PCPS-PRC.
Through these discussions, information gathered
through the peer review process can be considered by these
committees for possible new pronouncements to improve practice.
b.

Reviews Scheduled for 1980 and 1981

Since membership in the Section commenced in 1978 and
membership requirements call for a peer review once every three
years, no member firm was required to have a peer review prior to
1980.
However, during the year, the Section encouraged firms to
undergo their initial peer review in 1979 rather than in 1980. The
results were disappointing to the Section and to the Board,
especially since 70 of 110 member firms which had tentatively
selected 1979 as the year of their initial review postponed their
initial review to 1980.
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Confronted with the probability of having to administer
approximately
520
reviews
in
1980
(and
every
three
years
thereafter), the Executive Committee decided to permit certain
firms with fewer than five SEC clients to defer their initial
review until 1981.
Consequently, approximately 200 of the 520
firms have been assigned to have their initial reviews in 1980. The
remainder, only ten percent of which had any SEC clients, have been
allowed to defer their initial reviews to 1981.
Approximately 60 firms that joined the Section in 1978,
and which were to have their initial peer reviews in 1980,
requested the Committee to grant them extensions until 1981.
The
Committee granted seven of the requests and concluded that the
remainder
failed
to
establish
existence
of
a
significant
unavoidable hardship.
The Committee, together with the Executive
Committee, considered the effect such rejections might have on
membership in the Section and concluded that, in general, two years
was sufficient time for a firm to prepare for its initial review.
c.

Mergers and Acquisitions

The Organization Document2/ provides that member firms
are required to have a peer review conducted every three years "or
at such additional times as designated by the executive committee."
The Peer Review Committee, which is charged with the
administration of peer reviews, studied the question of whether a
merger of accounting firms should trigger a special peer review or
accelerate the timing of the next scheduled review.
The special
review would involve a review of the segments of the member firm's
practice acquired (merged) subsequent to its most recent review and
which had not been previously subjected to peer review.
The Peer Review Committee recommended, and the Executive
Committee adopted the recommendation, that no action was necessary
in such circumstances.
The primary reasons for the recommendation
are (1) current quality controls literature requires a firm to give
special attention to matters involved in mergers and acquisitions,
(2) a reasonable amount of time should be allowed to the firm to
assimilate the merged practice, and (3) the benefits of a special
peer review could not be cost justified in view of the short time
interval between
the special
review and
the next
regularly
scheduled peer review.
The first peer review of the combined firm is to be no
later than three years after the peer review of the predecessor
firm which had the larger accounting and auditing practice.

2/

The
the
and
for

document which sets forth the structure and functions of
SEC Practice Section is entitled "Organizational Structure
Functions of the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA Division
CPA Firms" ("Organization Document").
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The Executive Committee believes that effects of mergers
should be reported and accordingly amended the Section's annual
reporting requirements to include (1) the number of offices and the
number of accounting and auditing personnel of the acquired firm
and (2) the number of SEC clients of the acquired firm that will be
(a) serviced by practice units which were combined with practice
units of the acquiring firm or (b) continued as separate practice
units in the combined firm.
The Board generally concurs with the position of the Peer
Review and Executive Committees in this regard.
2.

Other Significant Activities

Since the Board's last annual report, the Committee
clarified and improved the standards and guidelines for performing
and reporting on peer reviews. The Committee also made progress in
resolving the difficult issues (1) of extending the peer review
process to include engagements performed outside the United States
and (2) of access by the SEC to reviewers' workpapers.
a.

Changes in Standards and Guidelines

The Committee issued additional guidelines for selection
of audit engagements to be reviewed and for testing compliance with
the Section's revised membership requirements regarding management
advisory services ("MAS").
These requirements were added during
the year as recommended in the Board's report entitled Scope of
Services by CPA Firms ("MAS Report").
b.

Review of Audit Work Performed Outside the
United States

As the SEC pointed out in its 1978 Report to Congress3/
and its 1979 Report to Congress,4 / it might take considerable time
to resolve the question of subjecting audit work performed outside
the United States to the peer review process. The Board observed in

3/

Securities and Exchange Commission Report to Congress on the
Accounting Profession and the Commission's Oversight R o l e ,
prepared for the Subcommittee on Governmental Efficiency and
the District
of Columbia
of
the
Senate Committee
on
Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess., 27-28
(Comm.
Print. 1978) ("SEC 1978 Report to Congress").

4/

Securities and Exchange Commission Report to Congress on the
Accounting Profession and the Commission's Oversight R o l e ,
prepared for the Subcommittee on Governmental Efficiency and
the District
of Columbia
of
the
Senate Committee
on
Governmental Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 36 (Comm. Print.
1979) ("SEC 1979 Report to Congress").
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its 1978-79 Annual Report that professional bodies and firms in the
United States have significant limitations on their authority to
impose review requirements on accounting firms in other countries;
indeed, such "intrusion" is often resented and must be handled with
discretion.
During 1979, the Committee studied this matter in depth.
Meetings were held with representatives of the profession in
Australia, Canada, France, The Netherlands, West Germany, and the
United Kingdom.
In addition, representatives of the Committee met
with
representatives of
the International Auditing Practices
Committee ("IAPC") of the International Federation of Accountants,
which was considering publication of an international auditing
guideline dealing with reliance on other auditors.
The Board has
been informed that IAPC has decided to publish on June 1, 1980, an
exposure draft on the subject.
The Committee adopted in principle an approach for review
of work done outside the U.S. which the Committee believes will be
supported by the professions in other countries and which is
consistent with existing U.S. auditing standards and with the
proposed international standard.
The Committee has also agreed to
adopt a similar approach for review of work done by domestic
affiliates. The approach focuses on the supervision and control of
segments of engagements performed by domestic or foreign affiliates
or correspondents.
To enable peer reviewers to test compliance, a
firm will be required to document several specified matters
relating to supervision and control. The Committee reports that it
plans to amend its standards accordingly, effective for audit
engagements beginning after June 30, 1980.
The Board supports the Committee's actions in this
respect and concludes that the Committee's approach achieves all
that can be done at this time, and appreciates the assistance of
IAPC in helping resolve this difficult problem.
B.

Board Monitoring of 1979 Reviews

Board representatives monitoring a specific review are
required to assess the appropriateness of the conduct of the review
and the reports issued and to challenge those that are not done in
accordance with standards.
They also review the propriety of
reviews terminated prior to completion.
1.

Types of Monitoring Programs

The Board used three different programs in monitoring
1979 peer reviews:
a visitation-observation program, a workpaperreview program, and a report-review program.
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The visitation-observation program consists of an exami
nation of workpapers and reports prepared by reviewers and of
visits to one or more offices of the reviewed firm during the
performance of the review, with emphasis on attendance at the exit
conference between reviewers and reviewed firm personnel.
These
visits are made by Board staff members with selective attendance by
Board members as well. The workpaper-review program consists of an
examination of workpapers, report and letter prepared by the
reviewers and the reviewed firm's response.
The report-review
program consists of a reading of the report, letter of comments,
and the reviewed firm's response.
2.

Selection of Reviews To Be Monitored

The Board adopted the following plan for selecting
work programs to be used in monitoring peer reviews:
•

Firms with
5 or more SEC clients— all
reviews are monitored using the visitationobservation program.

•

Firms with 1 to 4 SEC clients— 20% of the
reviews are monitored using the visitationobservation
program,
50%
using
the
workpaper-review program, and the remaining
30% using the report-review program.

•

Firms with no SEC clients— 10% of
the
reviews are monitored using the visitationobservation
program,
20%
using
the
workpaper-review program, and the remaining
70% using the report-review program.

the

The selections in the latter two groups are made at
random.
The Board's staff also examines the reviewers' workpapers
on any firm receiving a modified report arising from a deficiency
in its quality control system.
Because the number of reviews in 1979 was substantially
fewer than anticipated, the above percentages were exceeded.
The
majority of the reviews were subjected to the workpaper-review
monitoring program.
3.

Excluded Engagements

The SEC 1979 Report to Congress (pages 134-135) repeated
the SEC's concern regarding the right of the reviewed firm to
exclude certain engagements from the scope of the review. Only 2 of
the 40 firms reviewed in 1979 had requested a total of three engage
ments be excluded. Two non-public clients, one from each of the two
reviewed
firms,
requested
that
workpapers
on
their
audit
engagements not be subjected to peer review.
The third engagement
was excluded because of potential litigation involving the reviewed
firm and a former client.

9

In monitoring 1979 reviews, the Board determined the
engagements which were excluded, and satisfied itself that each
reason for exclusion was appropriate and that the exclusion did not
adversely affect the scope of the review.
4.

Supplemental Staff of the Board

As in the prior year, the Board employed three CPA firm
retired partners on a part-time basis to monitor 1979 reviews, most
of which are performed in the summer and fall months. Each of these
persons, John W. Nicholson (formerly of Arthur Young & Company), R.
Kirk Batzer (formerly of Coopers & Lybrand) and Harry F. Reiss, Jr.
(formerly of Ernst & Whinney), has extensive experience in quality
control systems of accounting and auditing practices. No member of
either the full-time or part-time staff is assigned to monitor a
review if the member was formerly associated with either the
reviewing or reviewed firm.
5.

Matters Raised by Staff on Specific Reviews

In two 1979 reviews, the Board's staff questioned whether
the review had been conducted according to prescribed standards.
Based upon the reviewers' workpapers, the Board's staff concluded
that the engagements reviewed did not represent a cross-section of
that firm's practice, and that a letter of comments should have
been issued in one review on the basis that there was insufficient
documentation of key areas in certain audit engagements.
As a
result, the Committee caused the reviewers to review additional
engagements
(expand the scope of the review)
and assigned a
committee member
to consult
with
the
reviewers
as
to
the
appropriateness of a letter of comments.
In its 1978-79 Annual Report, the Board reported that its
staff questioned whether reporting standards were appropriately
applied in one 1978 review and indicated that the Committee was
reviewing two cases where reviews were commenced but discontinued
prior
to
completion.
These matters
were
resolved
to
the
satisfaction of the Board's staff and the Board during the past
year.
6.

Review of Workpapers by the SEC

The
workpapers
prepared
by
the
Board's
staff
in
monitoring specific peer reviews in 1978 and 1979 have been made
available to, and have been examined by, the staff of the Chief
Accountant of the SEC.
These workpapers will continue to be
accessible by members of the staff of the Chief Accountant.
Notwithstanding this access to the Board's workpapers, the SEC 1979
Report to Congress (pages 33-34) expressed concern as to whether
the SEC would have sufficient access to the peer review process to
make an objective evaluation of its adequacy.
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In response to this concern, the Committee proposed a
procedure under which the SEC staff would be given access to
certain workpapers of reviewers; workpapers on review of individual
audit engagements, because they contain confidential client data,
would not be made available.
The Board is hopeful that the
combination of SEC access to all of the Board's peer review
workpapers and those workpapers available under the Committee's
recent proposal will satisfy the SEC's concerns regarding its
ability to properly evaluate the peer review process.
The staff of the Chief Accountant of the SEC suggested
ways in which the staff of the Board can improve documentation of
the basis for its satisfaction that the reviewers fully considered
and reported properly on the effects of the deficiencies noted in
their workpapers.
The Board's staff developed and discussed with
the staff of the SEC a proposed work program which would require
such additional documentation and the basis for its conclusions.
These additional documentation requirements will be applied in
monitoring future reviews.
C.

Board Conclusions on the Peer Review Program

1980 will be a key year for the peer review program. The
Board believes the review program developed by the Committee, the
monitoring program developed by the Board and the arrangements for
SEC access to workpapers of the Board and certain papers of the
reviewers will be severly tested in 1980.
While the Board
anticipates that 1980 experiences may afford opportunities for
further improvements,
it believes that the programs thus far
developed are well conceived and should benefit the member firms
and the profession and afford further assurances to the public.
III. PROCEDURES WITH RESPECT TO AUDIT FAILURES
As noted in the Board's 1978-79 Annual Report, one of the
first
matters
identified
by
the
Executive
Committee
for
consultation with the Board related to the investigative and
disciplinary action that should be taken by the Section with
respect to an alleged or possible audit failure involving a member
firm.
An important question arose as to whether disciplinary or
other proceedings by the Section should be deferred during the
pendency of litigation or investigation and threatened enforcement
action by the SEC or other governmental agencies.
A.

Board Recommendations

After extended study, the Board concluded that protection
of users of audited financial statements should be the dominant
consideration in any action taken by the Section with respect to a
possible audit failure.
The Board recommended that a permanent
committee be established to monitor, and to determine what action,
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if any, should be taken with respect to alleged or possible audit
failures involving member firms.
The principal purposes of the
committee and its monitoring effort would be to determine whether
facts relating to an audit failure indicate that auditing standards
are inadequate or that the quality controls of the member firm need
strengthening.
In developing these primary purposes, the Board
concluded
that
disciplinary
proceedings
directed
toward
the
punishment of a member firm were of less immediate importance,
particularly in view of the fact that the firm and individuals
involved in an audit failure would likely be facing punitive and
compensatory actions by governmental and regulatory bodies and by
private litigants.
Nonetheless, the Board recommended that the
Section
havethe authority
to
institute formal disciplinary
proceedings in those circumstances where such action is deemed
appropriate,
notwithstanding
the
pendency
of
litigation
or
governmental action.
B.

Procedures Adopted by Executive Committee

On November 29, 1979, after extensive discussion and
further consultation with the Board,
the Executive Committee
adopted a resolution set forth as Appendix B to the Organization
Document authorizing the establishment of a Special Investigations
Committee ("SIC") and adopted a document entitled The Special
Investigations Committee of the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA
Division
for
CPA
Firms ("SIC
Document") setting
forth
the
procedures to govern the operations of the SIC.
At the same time
the Executive Committee adopted a separate document entitled Rules
of Procedure for the Imposition of Sanctions ("Procedure Document")
which sets forth procedures established by the Executive Committee
applicable to all proceedings relating to the imposition of
sanctions by
the Section, i.e., proceedings by the Peer Review
Committee, the SIC and the Executive Committee.
Copies of the Organization Document, the SIC Document and
the Procedure Document are annexed as Exhibits III, V and VI to this
report.
Principal features of the Section's investigative and
disciplinary
mechanism
established
by
these
documents
are
summarized below, together with certain comments of the Board.
C.

The Special Investigations Committee

The SIC is appointed by the Executive Committee and is
composed of nine members who are partners or retired partners of
different member firms.
SIC members serve three-year staggered
terms and are eligible to serve two such terms in addition to
partial terms.
Procedures are established to avoid conflict of
interest situations.
The SIC should have whatever staff it needs
to perform its duties.
Initial members of the SIC, appointed in
December 1979, are shown in Exhibit VII.
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The SIC Document requires member firms to report to the
SIC, within 30 days of service on them of the first pleading in the
matter, or within 30 days after joining the Section if later, any
litigation (including criminal indictments) against them or their
personnel, or any proceeding or investigation publicly announced by
a regulatory agency, commenced on or after November 1, 1979 (not
including additional proceedings arising out of or related to facts
involved in litigation originally filed prior to November 1, 1979),
that involves clients or former clients that are SEC registrants
and that allege deficiencies in the conduct of an audit or in
reporting thereon in connection with any required filing under the
federal securities laws.
The SIC will screen information thus
reported and information from other sources relating to cases not
involving litigation commenced on or before November 1, 1979.
The Board initially questioned the November 1, 1979
cutoff date as being too restrictive with the result that the
Section would be powerless to deal with significant audit failures
involving litigation commenced prior to November 1, 1979. After an
extended conference with members of the Executive Committee,
however, the Board concluded that the cutoff date was justified by
practical considerations.
Moreover, in response to the Board's
concern, the Executive Committee, when it adopted the SIC Document
and the Procedure Document, also agreed to refer to the SIC on an ad
hoc basis any "case" (as defined below) that arose before November
1, 1979, and thus falls outside the SIC's jurisdiction, but which
requires prompt attention because events subsequent to November 1,
1979, indicate the matter has great potential significance to the
public and the profession.
On the basis of information screened by the SIC, it may
(1) monitor further developments without an investigation,
(2)
investigate the firm (without investigating the "case," i.e., the
specific alleged failure), to review certain of the firm's quality
control policies and procedures or to review other engagements by
the personnel involved in the case or of other engagements in the
same industry as the case, or (3) recommend investigation of the
case to the Executive Committee.
The scope of an investigation of
a firm will be established by the SIC, while the scope of an
investigation of a case will be established by the Executive
Committee.
The SIC Document states that the purpose of any such
investigation will be to determine whether
1.

Quality controls
firm, or

are

2.

There has been a material departure from generally
accepted auditing standards or a material failure to
comply
with
quality
control
standards
by
the
individuals
responsible
for
the
engagement
in
question, or
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inadequate

in

a

particular

3.

There is a need for reconsidering the adequacy of
certain generally accepted auditing standards or
quality controls standards.

The SIC Document contemplates that an investigation of a
case (but not of a firm) will not ordinarily be recommended by the
SIC if the case is the subject of a court proceeding or a proceeding
or investigation by the SEC, a grand jury, or other governmental
body until such matters are concluded.
Nevertheless, the SIC may
decide that a particular case is of such significance to the public
interest that the importance of immediately investigating it
outweighs any possible prejudice to the firm.
A member firm is required to cooperate in furnishing
information to the SIC and in any SIC-initiated investigation of a
firm or case unless the firm can demonstrate to the satisfaction of
the SIC (a) that there is a likelihood that the firm's rights in
pending litigation or other proceeding or investigation will be
unduly prejudiced by the firm's providing the requested information
and (b) that the need for such information is not sufficient to
override the interest of the firm or individuals in avoiding
prejudice in such litigation or other proceeding or investigation.
If a member firm fails to supply information to the SIC as required,
such failure will be a basis for the SIC to recommend to the
Executive Committee that sanctions be imposed on the firm.
D.

Sanctioning Hearings

At the conclusion of an investigation of a firm or a
case, the SIC may conduct a hearing to determine whether to
recommend sanctions to the Executive Committee.
(Sanctions may
also be recommended after a hearing by the Peer Review Committee as
a result of a regular peer review.)
Sanctions that may be recom
mended and imposed include the following:
1.

Requirements for corrective
tarily taken by the firm.

2.

Additional requirements for continuing professional
education.

3.

Special or accelerated peer review.

4.

Admonishment, censure or reprimand.

5.

Monetary fine.

6.

Suspension from membership in the Section.

7.

Expulsion from membership in the Section.
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measures

not
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Sanctions may be imposed only by the Executive Committee
after a hearing governed by the procedures set forth in the
Procedure Document. This document deals with the authority for and
nature of the hearings, the rights of the parties, and procedural
rules intended to provide for an orderly proceeding leading to a
fair result while adequately safeguarding the rights of member
firms and individuals.
Hearings are not open to the public and all matters
relating thereto are confidential until a decision is made by the
Executive Committee to impose sanctions.
Then the Executive
Committee will decide upon publishing in a membership periodical of
the AICPA the notice of the case and the decision to be published,
together with the name of the member firm. Documents setting forth
sanctions imposed on a member firm will be placed in the Section's
public file.
E.

Board Oversight

The Organization Document provides that the Board shall
monitor and evaluate the regulatory and sanction activities of the
Peer Review Committee and Executive Committee, which includes the
SIC.
The Procedure Document provides that the Board or its repre
sentative may have access to all briefs, memoranda, documentary
evidence, and stenographic transcripts of the hearing.
The Board
is required to maintain confidentiality with respect to all such
information.
Nevertheless, after giving the firm concerned an
opportunity to present its views and after consultation with the
Executive Committee, the Board may make public disclosure of
information thus obtained which it deems necessary in the interest
of the profession or the public.
F.

The Board's Appraisal

The Board has consulted with the Executive Committee on
all important aspects of the procedures outlined above and has
concluded that the procedures embody a reasonable framework for
self-policing and disciplinary measures to protect the public and
the profession.
Because the accounting profession has been the
subject of substantial litigation in recent years, it should be
recognized that the task of preparing the SIC Document and the
Procedure Document involved issues of extreme importance to the
profession.
The Board believes that, all things considered, a
balanced and practical result has been achieved.
Because the
procedures developed provide broad discretion to members of the
profession, the Board believes that the success or failure of the
overall program can only be judged by results which may require
several years of experience.
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The
Board
regards
effective
implementation
of
the
Section's investigative and monitoring procedures to be essential
features of the Section's self-regulatory program and intends to
give particular attention to monitoring such procedures and to
offer comments from time to time as appropriate.
IV.

Study of the Auditor's Work Environment
A.

Recommendation of Cohen Commission

After studying the audit environment as it existed prior
to June 1977, the Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities ("Cohen
Commission") issued a report5/ stating that its research indicated
that substandard auditing was frequently caused by time and budget
pressures placed on auditors.
That research consisted of a survey
conducted by John G. Rhode for the Cohen Commission6 / which also
stated that inadequate supervision on audits resulted in auditors
having signed for completing audit steps which were not in fact
performed.
Rhode based his conclusions on replies to a questionnaire
sent to present and former partners and staff members of auditing
firms.
While the Cohen Commission's analysis of legal cases did
not identify instances where unreasonable time budgets caused an
audit failure, the commission concluded that time pressure created
significant problems.
The lack of a proven relationship between
unreasonable time budgets and problem cases, in part, led the
commission to recommend that "individual public accounting firms
immediately undertake to conduct studies to determine the extent of
conditions revealed by the commission's study and the effects on
their practices" of pressures induced by time budgets (page 118).
B.

Action Taken by the Section

At the suggestion of the Board, a task force on Certain
Aspects of the Auditor's Work Environment ("Task Force") was formed
by the Section's Executive Committee to consider what actions the
Section should take relative to the conclusions of the Rhode study.

5/

The
Commission
on
Auditors'
Responsibilities:
Report,
Conclusions, and Recommendations (New York: AICPA, 1978).

6/

John Grant Rhode, The Independent Auditor's Work Environment:
A Survey. The Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities No. 4.
(New York: AICPA, 1978).
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After considerable discussion and study, the Task Force
presented its conclusions and recommendations in a position paper
entitled Certain Aspects of the Auditor's Work Environment, which
is reproduced as Appendix VIII of this report.
The position paper
was accepted by the Executive Committee and copies were distributed
to all member firms of the Section.
The Task Force position paper states that "serious
consideration must be given to any indications that some audits may
be performed at a substandard level, that excessive time and budget
pressures may be the cause of substandard audits,
and that
inadequate supervision and improper sign-off practices may result
from those pressures" and recommends that "firms take steps to
mitigate the possible effect of such conditions" (page 5).
In view of significant developments in the profession
since publication of the Cohen Commission report, the Task Force
does not believe that a pervasive condition of substandard audits
exists as a result of audit procedures omitted because of excessive
time pressures.
Nevertheless, the Task Force recommended that
firms (1) take steps to assure effective communication to staff of
the objectives of time budgeting,
(2) plan for and maintain
adequate numbers of supervisory staff, and (3) provide personnel
additional guidance, if needed, regarding the form and content of
working papers, the proper procedures for signing off for work
performed and for noting a change in planned procedures.
These
three recommendations are consistent with recent profession-wide
developments, namely, issuance of Statement on Auditing Standards
No. 22, Planning and Supervision, actions by the AICPA Division for
CPA Firms (especially the mandatory triennial peer reviews for
members of the Section), measures taken by the AICPA to discipline
individual member CPAs, and the issuance of Statement on Quality
Control Standards No. 1, System of Quality Control for a CPA F i r m .
While some firms may choose to conduct an internal survey
of partners and staff members concerning the auditor's work
environment, the Task Force considers such survey unnecessary and
concludes that the three procedures referred to above effectively
address the Cohen Commission's concerns.
C.

The Board's Appraisal

The Task Force position paper is a careful analysis of
the problems cited in the Cohen Commission report.
The problems
must
be solved
in the first
instance by individual public
accounting
firms.
The profession's
recent emphasis on the
supervision and control aspects of the conduct of an audit will
help eliminate the problems.
Finally, the peer review process,
which evaluates the reviewed firm's planning, supervision and
control policies and procedures and compliance therewith, should
also reduce the frequency of such deficiencies.
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The Board accepts the judgment that failure to perform
audit procedures because of constraints imposed by time budgets is
not a pervasive problem. Yet the Board believes that some firms may
have, in varying degrees, deficiencies attributable to time budget
pressures
on
auditors.
Accordingly,
the Board
endorses
the
recommendations made by the Task Force
(and adopted by the
Executive Committee) which essentially call for increased emphasis
on supervision and control of audits, preparation of realistic time
budgets and for raising the level of consciousness of staff members
regarding the objectives of time budgeting and the appropriate
manner for noting a change in a planned procedure or a decision not
to carry out the procedure.
V.

SCOPE OF SERVICES BY CPA FIRMS

In March 1979, the Board published its report, Scope of
Services by CPA Firms ("MAS Report"). A summary of the conclusions
and recommendations of the MAS Report was included in the Board's
1978-79 Annual Report. Since the publication of the annual report,
various interested parties have responded to the conclusions and
recommendations contained in the MAS Report.
A.

Reactions to MAS Report
1.

Executive Committee of the Section

Several
of
the
Board's
recommendations
called
for
affirmative action by the Executive Committee.
In this regard, the
Board generally recommended the following:
(1) any rules relating
to management advisory services ("MAS") engagements should be based
on maintaining the independence and objectivity of the auditor in
the course of his conduct of an audit; (2) compliance with the
existing standards relating to MAS and independence contained in
the AICPA Professional Standards on Management Advisory Services
and in the AICPA Code of Professional Ethics should be made a
condition of membership in the Section; (3) the peer review process
should be expanded to require review of MAS engagements for SEC
audit clients to test for compliance with independence standards
enunciated by the AICPA; (4) member firms should be required to
disclose in their annual statements filed with the Section the
amount of fees received from audit clients for MAS and tax services
performed, expressed as a percentage of aggregate fees received
during the reporting period; and (5) members of the Section should
be prohibited from performing exclusive or primary actuarial
services for insurance company audit clients.
On June 21, 1979, the Executive Committee adopted several
revisions of the Organization Document, many of which were in
response to the recommendations in the MAS Report. That document
was revised to require member firms to adhere to the AICPA
Professional Standards on Management Advisory Services and the
AICPA Code of Professional Ethics with respect to independence in
performing MAS for audit clients
that are SEC registrants.
Pursuant to that revision, members are prohibited from serving as
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an actuary for an insurance company audit client with respect to
policy reserves and related accounts unless the primary actuarial
assistance to management comes from actuaries not related to the
auditing firm. Actuarial assistance in other areas is permissible,
subject to the requirements that the service remain advisory.
Consistent with the recommendations in the MAS Report,
members continue to be prohibited from furnishing certain executive
recruiting services to SEC audit clients and from providing merger
and acquisition assistance to such clients for a finder's fee.
In
addition, the Executive Committee continued the prohibition on
providing such clients psychological testing services and public
opinion polling services.
The Executive Committee took action in two additional
areas in direct response to the Board's recommendation.
The
committee instructed its Peer Review Committee to incorporate into
the peer review process a review of MAS engagements for audit
clients to test for compliance with the independence standards. In
addition, annual statements of members which are placed in the
public file at the AICPA must now reveal gross fees for MAS and tax
services performed for SEC registrant audit clients, expressed as a
percentage of total fees charged to such clients.
As reflected in the foregoing discussion, the Executive
Committee implemented all of the Board's recommendations, albeit
not in all instances in precisely the form suggested. Nonetheless,
the Board is satisfied with the action taken by the Executive
Committee.
One of the possible deviations from the Board's recommen
dations exists in the continued proscription of psychological
testing and public opinion polling.
Any general proscription of
these services would seem to be predicated on concerns for
maintaining professional image and not on independence.
While in
its MAS Report the Board recommended against proscribing specific
services
on
the
basis
of
image
impairment,
it made
that
recommendation
because
of
the
difficulty
of
making
such
determinations in any fair and comprehensive way and because it
believed that proxy statement disclosure regarding MAS,
then
recently imposed on SEC registrants, should be given a chance to
work.
At the same time, the Board expressed serious concern with
unfettered proliferation of MAS and urged members to exercise selfrestraint in expanding into new areas of MAS.
In light of the Board's concern over the potential
impairment of professional image,
it did not object to the
Executive Committee's decision to retain the proscription with
respect to psychological testing and opinion polling.
In fact,
recent publicly announced actions and advertisements by some large
accounting firms suggest that they may have misinterpreted the
Board's decision not to recommend the proscription of specific
services which may impair professional image.
The Board will
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continue to monitor this aspect of the accounting profession,
including formal disclosures contained in proxy statements of SEC
registrants and in annual statements filed by members with the
Section.
It is the hope of the Board that the new disclosure
provisions and, above all, an inclination toward self-restraint
will operate to preserve and enhance the accountant's image, which,
in itself, is a confidence-building factor in the public attitude
toward auditors.
2.

Securities and Exchange Commission

On June 14, 1979, the Securities and Exchange Commission
published Accounting Series Release 264 ("ASR 264") which contains
the Commission's views of the issues raised by MAS.
While the
Commission in ASR 264 endorsed several of the conclusions reached
by the Board in its MAS Report, it stated that the MAS Report did
"not adequately sensitize the profession and its clients to
potential effects on the independence of accountants of performance
of non-audit services for audit clients."
A similar criticism was
made in the SEC 1979 Report to Congress (page 81).
Since the Commission invited comments on ASR 264, the
Board, in a letter to the SEC dated October 10, 1979, commented on
certain aspects of ASR 264 with which it disagreed. Generally, the
Board commented that ASR 264 (1) fails to recognize adequately the
efforts of the AICPA over the years in addressing problems raised
by MAS;
(2) fails to give sufficient guidance as to whether
adherence to the MAS standards for membership in the Section will
be a sufficient defense against a charge that MAS impaired an
auditor's independence? and (3) confuses notions of independence
and professional image.
The Board also commented that ASR 264 may
discourage managements and boards of directors from retaining their
auditors for MAS engagements in circumstances where it may very
well be in the interest of shareholders to do so, and that it
incorrectly
concluded
that
the
MAS
Report
recommended
no
proscriptive rules solely on the basis that there was an absence of
empirical evidence showing that MAS impairs independence. Finally,
the
Board
advised
the SEC
that ASR
264
unnecessarily
and
unfortunately casts a cloud over the performance of MAS related to
internal controls at a time when the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
makes it essential for boards of directors and audit committees to
seek assurances of their independent auditors with respect to
internal control systems.
The Board believes that audit committees and boards of
directors are qualified to make reviews and determinations as to
the effect of MAS on independence of their auditors as called for by
ASR 250. It regrets the confusion that seems to have resulted among
audit committees and boards of directors from the issuance of ASR
264.
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On January 3, 1980, in a speech before the AICPA Seventh
National Conference on Current SEC Developments, SEC Chairman
Williams clarified and expanded upon certain aspects of ASR 264,
stating that the Commission, in issuing ASR 264, did not intend to
"deprecate
the
benefits
that
may
accrue
from
certain
MAS
activities."
He indicated that assisting clients in reviewing
internal accounting control systems would typically be the type of
service that would produce enough benefits to more than offset the
danger that such assistance might impair the auditing firm's inde
pendence.
Chairman Williams also acknowledged that ASR 264
inadvertently uses the terms "non-audit services" and "MAS" inter
changeably, but recognized that MAS encompasses a narrower scope of
activities and stated that the Commission did not intend to
stigmatize firms that receive a substantial amount of their fees
from tax work and so-called "accounting and review services."
With respect to whether a firm's dependence on MAS could
affect its independence, Chairman Williams indicated that, even
though ASR 264 suggested that an auditor's independence might be
impaired by the magnitude of the ratio of the firm's non-audit fees
to audit fees for a specific client or for the firm as a whole, the
Commission did not mean to suggest that it would, after the fact,
question an auditor's independence based solely on a percentage
relationship.
The Chairman did say that the profession cannot
ignore the magnitude of MAS on a firm-wide basis since "undue
emphasis on MAS could ultimately translate into an effect on the
quality of audit work performed."
In its MAS Report (page 25), the Board expressed a
similar concern by stating that a disproportionate amount of MAS
performed on a firm-wide basis may result in a dilution or
perceived dilution of the accounting firm's primary service which,
in turn, may impair its professional image. Whether the threat is
to the quality of audits, as suggested by Chairman Williams, or to
the image of the profession, as suggested in the MAS Report, or
both, is not important to decide now, but the profession should
recognize the concern expressed by both the Commission and the
Board and act to prevent any such impairment.
3.

Other Comments

Under a letter dated May 24, 1979, the American Academy
of Actuaries
("Academy"), furnished the Board a copy of its
comments, prepared for the SEC's Chief Accountant, criticizing the
analyses and conclusions in the MAS Report relating to actuarial
services.
The criticism alleged that the MAS Report contained
certain inconsistencies and that the Board incorrectly interpreted
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and applied Statement of Auditing Standards Number 11 ("SAS 11 ")7 /.
The Board relied on SAS 11 in its conclusion that performing both
actuarial and audit services for a client did not pose a problem of
self-review.
The Academy argued
that the Board had
incorrectly
concluded that SAS 11 could be relied upon by an auditing firm in
circumstances
where
an
employee
of
the firm performed
the
specialized services to which SAS 11 refers, intending instead that
SAS 11 may be applied only where the specialist has no relationship
with the auditor.
The Board presented the Academy's position on SAS 11 to
the AICPA and sought clarification of the question presented by the
Academy's argument.
The AICPA confirmed that the MAS Report
properly interpreted the application of SAS 11 and that the
position taken by the Academy was incorrect.
In a letter to the
SEC's Chief Accountant, dated August 9, 1979, the Board advised
that it had reviewed the Academy's contentions regarding SAS 11 and
other matters and that it wished to affirm the conclusions it had
reached in the MAS Report on all points raised by the Academy.
Copies of this correspondence are available from the Board's
executive director.
Aside from the Academy's comment to the Commission, the
Board received no other
formal comments on the MAS Report.
However, several persons in their written comments to the SEC on
ASR 264 included reference to the MAS Report, in most instances
criticizing the Commission for failing to give adequate recognition
to the conclusions reached by the Board.
B.

Monitoring MAS Disclosures

As indicated in the MAS Report (pages 46 and 56), proxy
statement disclosures and peer reviews of MAS performed for audit
clients will supply new data on the nature and extent of MAS
furnished to audit clients who are SEC registrants.
The Board
intends to monitor this new source of information and comment if
the facts suggest that the self-restraint urged by the Board is
ignored by the profession or if the magnitude of MAS appears to
increase
to an extent
that
it threatens professional
image
generally.

7/

SAS 11, issued by the AICPA Auditing Standards Board, generally
provides that an auditor obtain an understanding of the methods
and assumptions used by a specialist and need not perform
comprehensive audit procedures or challenge the specialist's
methods or assumptions, unless his limited review procedures
lead him to believe that the findings are unreasonable under
the circumstances.
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VI.

SEC PRACTICE SECTION
A.

Changes in Executive Committee

The Section's Organization Document states that the
Executive Committee shall be composed of representatives of at
least twenty-one member firms.
The document further provides that
The executive committee shall at all times
include representatives of all member firms
which audit the financial statements of thirty
or more registrants under section 12 of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and at
least five representatives of firms which audit
financial statements of fewer than thirty such
registrants plus one additional such represen
tative for each representative, in excess of
sixteen, of firms which audit thirty or more
such registrants.
At the date of the Board's 1978-79 Annual Report, the
Executive Committee consisted of representatives of sixteen firms
that were entitled to representation on the committee because of
the number of SEC audit clients and representatives of six other
member firms.
During the past year, because of mergers between
four
such firms,
the number
of representatives
entitled
to
automatic representation was reduced to fourteen.
In June 1979, Walter E. Hanson of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell
& Co. reported that he would not be available to serve as Chairman
of the Executive Committee for 1979-80.
At the August 7, 1979,
meeting of the Executive Committee, Archibald E. MacKay of Main
Hurdman & Cranstoun was elected to serve as Chairman for the 197980 committee year.
The Chairman serves at the pleasure of the
committee but in no event for more than three one-year terms.
The firms represented on the Executive Committee as of
March 31, 1980, are shown in Exhibit IV of this report.
B.

Changes in Membership Requirements

The number of firms auditing SEC clients that are not
members of the Section is a matter of major importance that the
Board has discussed with the Executive Committee on several
occasions.
Since the Board's 1978-79 Annual Report, the Section has
made changes in certain of its requirements to encourage more
accounting firms that audit at least one SEC client to join the
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Section.
The changes were made on the basis of information
gathered by the Section's membership committee and staff and are
summarized below:
1.

Membership dues for firms that audit less than five
SEC clients were limited to a maximum of $100 per
year.
(Firms with five or more SEC clients are
assessed dues — $15 per capita for 1980 — based on
the number of all professional staff with no upper
limit.)

2.

Insurance requirements for firms that audit less
than five SEC clients were reduced to require such
firms to maintain $50,000 of liability insurance
coverage per qualified staff person, with a minimum
of $250,000; maximum of $5,000,000.
(Firms that
audit five or more SEC clients are required to
maintain a minimum of $2,000,000 of insurance;
maximum of $10,000,000).

3.

Billing rates for peer reviews of firms with less
than 20 professionals were reduced to the rates used
by the Private Companies Practice Section.

4.

As noted in Section II of this report, steps were
taken
to permit PCPS-PRC participation
in the
administration of peer reviews of firms that audit
less than five SEC clients.

The Board believes that these changes are responsive to
concerns expressed by smaller firms and do not weaken in any way the
Section's effectiveness.
C.

Changes in Membership

A summary of the changes in the membership of the Section
is presented below:
Breakdown by
Number of SEC Clients
Total
Number
of Firms
March 31, 1979
New Members
Resignations
Mergers
Reclassifications, net
March 31, 1980

550
140
(112)
(4)

5 or
More

Less
Than 5

44
9
(1)
(10)

167
54
(24)
(1)
7

339
77
(88)
(2)
3

42

203

329

-

-

574
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None

The increase during the year in the number of accounting
firms that are members of the Section was disappointing to the
Section and the Board, especially in light of the changes made in
the Section's membership requirements in order to encourage new
members.
The SEC has noted with concern that approximately 600
accounting firms that audit at least one SEC client have still not
joined the Section.
Without minimizing that concern, there have
been some positive signs.
For example, there has been a positive
trend in the number of U.S. companies listed on the New York Stock
Exchange and the American Stock Exchange that are audited by member
firms, as indicated in the following tabulation:

NYSE
Listed U.S. companies whose auditors
were not members of the Section at
March 31, 1979
Less:

Companies whose auditors
during the year
— joined the Section
— resigned from the Section
Companies that changed to auditors who
— are members of the Section
— are not members of the Section
Effect of changes in listed companies
— net

Listed U.S. companies whose auditors
were not members of the Section at
March 31, 1980

ASE

11

64

6

20
(1 )

2
(1)

4

-

3

4
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More importantly, the firms that are members of the
Section do
represent, in terms of the SEC clients they audit, a
significant commitment to effective self regulation. TheSection's
records indicate that member firms audit 8,880 SEC clients and that
those clients represent
•

92%
of
the
estimated
9,700
companies
required to file financial statements with
the SEC under various sections of
the
Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.

•

All but 4 of the U.S. companies listed on
the New York Stock Exchange
(based
on
December 1979 NYSE listing).

•

All but 38 of the U.S. companies listed on
the American
Stock
Exchange
(based
on
December 1979 ASE listing).
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•

D.

93% of the 2 , 0 2 1 companies included in NASD
listings of over-the-counter securities re
ported in the January 8, 1980, Wall Street
Journal that could be located in M o o d y 's
Complete Corporate Index.

Efforts of the Section to Increase Membership

During the year, the Section continued its efforts to
increase membership by appealing directly to firms that had not yet
joined and by engaging in general promotional activities.
•

A December 1977 "Auditor Listing" obtained
from Disclosure Incorporated included the
names of approximately 325 accounting firms
that could not be identified
in AICPA
records.
The Section, with the aid of
member firms and state societies, was able
to locate addresses for 161 of those firms
and mailed
them appropriate promotional
literature.

•

The Section contacted by telephone all
nonmember firms that audit five or more SEC
clients and a sample of firms that audit one
to four SEC clients.
(Information gained
from these conversations was useful to the
Section in deciding on the changes that were
made in the Section's requirement.)

•

Personal letters were sent to firms that
audit one or more SEC clients but are
members
only
of
the
Private
Companies
Practice Section.

•

Letters were sent to firms that are not
members of the Section and that are included
in the fourth edition of Who Audits America.

•

A brochure was published on the Division for
CPA Firms
and given wide distribution,
including
a gratis distribution
to all
members of the Robert Morris Associates. •

•

Representatives of member firms, partic
ularly those on the Executive and Peer
Review Committees, and the Section's staff
have accepted all available opportunities
to
speak or write about the Section's
activities.
In
that
connection,
the
executive directors of certain larger state
societies have been specifically asked for
help in identifying speaking opportunities
for representatives of the Section and the
Board.
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Although these activities represent a significant effort,
results have been limited and disappointing.
However, because of
the importance of improving the public perception of the Section's
effectiveness,
the Board believes these activities should be
continued.
E.

External Factors

In June 1979, the Board received a letter from the staff
of the New York Stock Exchange, accompanied by a list of 101
accounting firms, requesting information as to whether those firms
were members of the Section.
Not all 101 firms audit SEC clients,
as defined; many audit broker dealers.
Seventy-eight of those
firms were not members of the Section, and each was advised that the
requested information had been sent to the New York Stock Exchange.
F.

Publication of Directory of Member Firms

At its Spring 1979 meeting, the AICPA Council agreed to
publish, during the Summer of 1980, a directory of firms that are
members of the Division for CPA Firms, which would not include
section designation.
The Board understands that many firms that are not
members of the SEC Practice Section are strongly opposed to section
designation in any directory.
The Board continues to hold the
view,
as previously communicated
to the Section's Executive
Committee,
that
there
is
"substantial
disadvantage
in
the
indefinite prolongation of a policy of non-disclosure of the
identity of members of the SEC Practice Section...."
G.

Disclosure of Section Membership in Proxy Statements

SEC Chairman Williams, in a speech on January 3, 1980,
stated that the SEC's staff is considering requiring registrants to
disclose in proxy statements whether their auditing firms are
members of the Section and whether they have been subjected to a
peer review.
The Board believes that this suggestion recognizes
the benefits accruing to the public from membership in the Section,
and more particularly from the requirement that member firms
undergo triennial peer reviews. Moreover, a direct salutary effect
of such a requirement would be to increase the pressure on
accounting firms to join the Section. Accordingly, the Board would
favor such a disclosure requirement.
The Board urges the profession to seek out speaking op
portunities before financial analysts, bankers and other users of
financial statements to inform them of the Section's purpose and
especially of its peer review program.
Such publicity could cause
financial statement user groups to induce audit firms to become
members of the Section.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
The Board believes that in the past year the Section has
shown continued strong commitment to the success of its selfregulatory program.
This is evidenced by (1) further progress in
developing and administering its peer review program, (2) adoption
of an initial program for surveillance and disciplinary action in
cases of alleged or possible audit failure, (3) the review of the
auditor's work environment, (4) efforts to enlarge membership of
the Section, and (5) continued attention to the scope of services
issue.
The SEC continues to be supportive with its constructive
criticism and comments.
The Section will face many challenges in 1980-1981 to
make
its programs more effective.
The SIC will have
the
opportunity to develop surveillance and investigatory procedures.
The increased activity in peer reviews will require a major
expenditure of time by the profession and the Board.
The Board
believes, however, that the experience thus far gained will enable
the profession to make continued progress in 1980 and the years
ahead.
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Exhibit I

COMPOSITION OF PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD
YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1980

Term Expires

Affiliation

Name

Position

John J. McCloy

Chairman

December 31, 1980

Partner, Milbank, Tweed,
Hadley & McCloy, New York

Ray Garrett, Jr.*

ViceChairman

December 31, 1981

Partner, Gardner, Carton
& Douglas, Chicago

William L. Cary

Member

December 31, 1981

Professor of law, Columbia
University, New York

John D. Harper

Member

December 31, 1982

Former chairman of the
board and chief executive
officer of Aluminum Company
of America, Pittsburgh

Arthur M. Wood

Member

December 31, 1982

Former chairman of the
board and chief executive
officer of Sears, Roebuck
& C o . , Chicago

Staff and Counsel to Board Members
Richard A. Stark

Secretary of Board
and Counsel to
Mr. McCloy

Partner, Milbank, Tweed,
Hadley & McCloy, New York

Charles R. Manzoni, Jr.

Counsel to
Mr. Garrett

Partner, Gardner, Carton
& Douglas, Chicago

Louis W. Matusiak

Executive Director

Charles J. Evers

Technical Director

*Mr. Garrett died on February 3, 1980.
has not been selected.
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As of this date, his replacement

Exhibit II
PUBLIC
STATEMENT
FOR THE YEAR
AND STATEMENT
FOR THE YEAR

OVERSIGHT BOARD
OF ACTUAL EXPENSES
ENDING JULY 31, 1979
OF ESTIMATED EXPENSES
ENDING JULY 31, 1980

Estimated
Expenses for
12 Months
Ending
July 31, 1980
Regular fees of board members
Fees for professional services
paid to firms of board members:
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy
Gardner, Carton & Douglas
Reimbursement of expenses to
Board members and their firms:
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy
Gardner, Carton & Douglas
All others
Salaries of staff, including
part-time reviewers
Office expenses:
Personnel
Occupancy
Printing and paper
General
Total office expenses
Total expenses
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Actual
Expenses for
12 Months
Ending
July 31, 1979

$180,000

$147,500

7 5 ,000
5 0 ,000

100,250
70,752

12,000
14,000

8,000

10,945
10,340
4,355

200,000

161,773

25,000
29,000
4,000
55,000

23,633
21,131
11,713
55,225

113,000

111,702

$652,000

$617,617

Exhibit III

Organizational Structure and
Functions of the SEC Practice
Section of the AICPA Division for
CPA Firms
I.

Source of Authority
T he section was established by a resolution of the Council of
the AICPA adopted on September 17, 1977.

II.

Name
T h e name of the section shall be the “SEC Practice Section”
of the AICPA Division for CPA Firms.

III.

Objectives
T he objectives of the section shall be to achieve the following:
1. Improve the quality of practice by CPA firms before the
Securities and Exchange Commission through the estab
lishment of practice requirements for member firms.
2. Establish and m aintain an effective system of self-regula
tion of member firms by means of mandatory peer reviews,
required maintenance of appropriate quality controls,
and the imposition of sanctions for failure to meet
membership requirements.
3. Enhance the effectiveness of the section’s regulatory system
through the m onitoring and evaluation activities of an
independent oversight board composed of public mem
bers.
4. Provide a forum for development of technical information
relating to SEC practice.

IV.

Membership
1. Eligibility and Admission of Members
All CPA firms are eligible for membership in the section
even though they do not practice before the SEC. Mem
bership in the section shall not constitute membership in
the AICPA nor entitle any member firm to any of the
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rights or privileges of membership in the AICPA. T o
become a member, a firm must submit to the section a
written application agreeing to abide by all of the re
quirem ents for membership. The application must be
accompanied by firm information for the most recent full
fiscal year as described under 3 (g) of this section.
T h e membership of the section shall consist of all
firms which meet with the admission requirements and
continue to maintain their membership in good standing.
2. Termination and Reinstatement of Members
(a)

Membership of a CPA firm may be term inated—
(1) By submission of a resignation, provided the
firm is not the subject of a pending investiga
tion or recommendation of the peer review
committee for sanctions or other disciplinary
action by the executive committee or under
review by the public oversight board.
(2) By action of the executive committee for
failure to adhere to the requirem ents of mem
bership.
(b) Membership of a term inated CPA firm may be
reinstated—
(1) By complying with the admission requirements
for new members if term ination occurred by
resignation.
(2) By complying with the admission requirements
for new members and obtaining the approval of
the executive committee if term ination was
imposed as a sanction.
3. Requirements of Members
Member firms shall be obligated to abide by the following:
(a) Ensure that a majority of members of the firm are
CPAs, that the firm can legally engage in the practice
of public accounting, and that each proprietor,
shareholder, or partner of the firm resident in the
United States and eligible for AICPA membership
is a member of the AICPA.
(b) Adhere to quality control standards established by
the AICPA Quality Control Standards Committee.
(c) Submit to peer reviews of the firm’s accounting and
audit practice every three years or at such additional
times as designated by the executive committee, the
reviews to be conducted in accordance with review
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standards established by the section’s peer review
committee (see Appendix C).
(d) Ensure that all professionals in the firm resident in
the United States, including CPAs and non-CPAs,
participate in at least one hundred twenty hours
of continuing professional education over three
years, but in not less than twenty hours in any given
year.1
(e) Assign a new audit partner to be in charge of each
SEC engagement2 that has had another audit part 
ner-in-charge for a period of five consecutive years
and prohibit such incumbent partner from retu rn 
ing to in-charge status on the engagement for a
m inim um of two years except as follows:
(1) This requirem ent shall not become effective
until two years after a firm becomes a member.3
(2) In unusual circumstances, the chief executive
partner of a firm or his designee may grant no
more than one two-year extension so long as
there is an in-depth supplemental review by
another partner.
(3) An application for relief is granted by the
peer review committee on the basis of unusual
hardships.
(f)

Ensure that a concurring review of the audit report
by a partner other than the audit partner in charge
of an SEC engagement is required before issuance
of an audit report on the financial statements of an
SEC registrant (see Appendix E).4 T he peer review
committee may authorize alternative procedures
where this requirem ent cannot be met because of
the size of the member firm.

1 See section 6 of this manual for additional information about the continuing
professional education requirement, including a requirement to file an annual
educational report within four months after the completion of each educational
year.
2 See Appendix D—“Definition of an SEC Engagement,” for purposes of deter
mining compliance with the membership requirements of 3(e), (f), and (g) of
this section.
3 Effective for audits of financial statements of SEC clients for periods ending
after June 30, 1980, or two years after the date the firm becomes a member,
whichever is later.
4 Effective for audits of financial statements of SEC clients for periods ending
after June 30, 1978, or the date the firm becomes a member, whichever is later.
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(g)

File with the section for each fiscal year of the United
States firm (covering offices m aintained in the
United States and its territories) the following in 
formation, within ninety days of the end of such
fiscal year, to be open to public inspection:5
(1) Form of business entity (e.g., partnership or
corporation) and identification of domestic
affiliates rendering services to clients.
(2) Description or chart of internal organizational
structure and international organization (in
cluding the nature of relationships m ain
tained in each geographic region).
(3) N um ber and location of offices.
(4) T otal num ber of partners and non-CPAs with
parallel status within the firm’s organizational
structure.
(5) Total num ber of CPAs (including partners).
(6) Total num ber of professional staff (including
partners).
(7) T otal num ber of personnel (including item
6, above).
(8) N um ber and names of SEC clients for which
the firm is principal auditor-of-record and any
changes of such clients.
(9) N um ber of SEC audit clients each of whose
total domestic fees exceed 5 percent of total
domestic firm fees and the percentage which
each of these clients’ fees represents to total
domestic firm fees.
(10) A statement indicating that the firm has com
plied with AICPA and SEC independence re
quirements.
(11) Disclosure regarding pending litigation as re
quired under generally accepted accounting
principles and indicating whether such pend
ing litigation is expected to have a material
effect on the firm’s financial condition or its
ability to serve clients.
(12) Gross fees for accounting and auditing, tax,
and MAS expressed as a percentage of total
gross fees.6

5 The annual report should disclose the member firm's educational year, if
different from its fiscal year, and any change in the educational year (see
section 6 of this manual, I.C).
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(13) Gross fees for both MAS and tax services per
formed for SEC audit clients, expressed as a
percentage of total fees charged to all SEC
audit clients.
(h) Maintain such minimum amounts and types of
accountants’ liability insurance as shall be prescribed
from time to time by the executive committee.
(i) Adhere to the portions of the AICPA Code of Pro
fessional Ethics and Management Advisory Services
Practice Standards dealing with independence in
performing management advisory services for audit
clients whose securities are registered with the SEC.
Refrain from performing for such clients services
that are inconsistent with the firm's responsibilities
to the public or that consist of the following types
of services:
(1) Psychological testing.
(2) Public opinion polls.
(3) Merger and acquisition assistance for a finder’s
fee.
(4) Executive recruitm ent as described in Appen
dix A.
(5) Actuarial services to insurance companies as
described in Appendix A.
(j) Report annually to the audit committee or board of
directors (or its equivalent in a partnership) of each
SEC audit client on the total fees received from the
client for management advisory services during the
year under audit and a description of the types of
such services rendered.
(k) Report to the audit committee or board of directors
(or its equivalent in a partnership) of each SEC
audit client on the nature of disagreements with the
management of the client on financial accounting
and reporting matters and auditing procedures
which, if not satisfactorily resolved, would have
caused the issuance of a qualified opinion on the
client’s financial statements.6
(l) Pay dues as established by the executive committee
and comply with the rules and regulations of the
section, as established from time to time by the
6 Effective for audits of financial statements of SEC clients for periods ending
after June 30, 1978, or the date the firm becomes a member, whichever is later.
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executive committee, and with the decisions of the
executive committee in respect of matters within
its competence; in connection with their duties, in
cluding disciplinary proceedings, cooperate with the
peer review committee and the special investiga
tions committee established by resolution of the
executive committee as set out in the Appendix B
hereto; and comply with any sanction that may be
imposed by the executive committee.
(m) R eport to the special investigations committee, with
in 30 days of service on the firm or its personnel
of the first pleading in the m atter or within 30 days
of joining the section if later,7 any litigation (in
cluding criminal indictments) against it or its per
sonnel, or any proceeding or investigation publicly
announced by a regulatory agency, commenced on
or after November 1, 1979 (not including additional
proceedings arising out of or related to facts involved
in litigation originally filed prior to November 1,
1979), that involves clients or former clients that
are SEC registrants and that alleges deficiencies in
the conduct of an audit or reporting thereon in
connection with any required filing under the
Federal securities laws.8 W ith respect to matters
previously reported under this subparagraph, mem
ber firms shall report to the committee additional
proceedings, settlements, court decisions on sub
stantive issues, and the filing of appeals within 30
days of their occurrence.

V.

Governing Bodies
T h e activities of the section shall be governed by an execu
tive committee having senior status within the AICPA with
authority to carry out the activities of the section. Such
activities shall not conflict with the policies and standards

7 Since the Committee is not expected to be appointed before December 1979,
the first report by member firms is to be filed by January 31, 1980. The initial
report shall identify the litigation and be accompanied by copies of the com
plaints or indictment or other charges filed with the courts involved.
8 An allegation in such formal litigation, proceeding or investigation that a
member firm or its personnel have violated the Federal securities laws in con
nections with services other than an audit for an SEC registrant shall be
reported.
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of the AICPA. All activities of the section shall be subject
to the oversight and public reporting thereon by a public
oversight board.

Executive Committee
1. Composition and Terms
(a) T he executive committee shall be composed of
representatives of at least twenty-one member firms.
(b) T he terms of executive committee members shall
be for three years, with initial staggered terms to
provide for seven expirations each year.
(c) Executive committee members shall continue in
office until their successors have been appointed.
2. Appointment
(a)

T h e members of the executive committee shall be
appointed by the AICPA chairman with the ap
proval of the AICPA Board of Directors.
(b) All appointments after the initial executive commit
tee is established shall also require approval of the
then existing executive committee.
(c) Nominations for appointments of representatives of
member firms to the executive committee shall be
provided to the chairman of the AICPA by a
nom inating committee of the section. T he section’s
nom inating committee shall be elected by the
AICPA Council and consist of individuals drawn
from seven of the member firms of the section. It
is intended that nominations shall adhere to the
principle that the executive committee shall at all
times include representatives of all member firms
which audit the financial statements of thirty or
more registrants under section 12 of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934 and at least five represen
tatives of firms which audit financial statements of
fewer than thirty such registrants plus one addi
tional such representative for each representative, in
excess of sixteen, of firms which audit thirty or more
registrants.
3. Election of Chairman
T h e chairman of the executive committee shall be elected
from among its members to serve at the pleasure of the
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executive committee but in no event for more than three
one-year terms.
4. Responsibilities and Functions
T h e executive committee shall—
(a) Establish general policies for the section and over
see its activities.
(b) Amend requirem ents for membership as necessary,
but in no event shall such requirements be designed
so as to unreasonably preclude membership by any
CPA firm.
(c) Establish budgets and dues requirem ents to fund
activities of the section not provided for in the
AICPA general budget. Such dues shall be scaled
in proportion to the size of member firms.
(d) Determ ine sanctions to be imposed on member
firms based upon recommendations of the peer re
view committee of the section.
(e) Receive, evaluate, and act upon other complaints
received with respect to actions of member firms.
(f) Establish the initial public oversight board with the
approval of the AICPA Board of Directors.
(g) Appoint persons to serve on such committees and
task forces as necessary to carry out its functions.
(h) Make recommendations to other AICPA boards and
committees for their consideration.
(i) Consult from time to time with the public oversight
board.
5. Quorum, Voting, Meetings, and Attendance
(a) A majority of the members of the executive com
mittee or their designated alternates must be present
to constitute a quorum.
(b) Affirmative votes of a majority of the members of
the executive committee shall be required for action
on all matters.
(c) Meetings of the executive committee shall be held
at such times and places as determined by the
chairman.
(d) Representatives of member firms of the section may
attend meetings of the executive committee as ob
servers under rules established by the executive com
mittee. Such attendance will not be permitted
when the committee is considering disciplinary
matters.
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VII.

Public Oversight Board
1. Size, Appointment, Removal, and Compensation
T h e public oversight board shall consist of five members.
Members of such board shall be drawn from among
prom inent individuals of high integrity and reputation,
including, b ut not limited to, former public officials,
lawyers, bankers, securities industry executives, educators,
economists, and business executives.
Following its initial appointment, the public over
sight board shall, in consultation with and subject to the
approval of the AICPA Board of Directors, appoint, re
move, and set the terms and compensation of its members
and select its chairman. However, such board shall auto
matically term inate in the event of the term ination of the
SEC practice section of the AICPA Division for CPA
Firms.
2. Responsibilities and Functions
T h e public oversight board shall—
(a) M onitor and evaluate the regulatory and sanction
activities of the peer review and executive commit
tees to assure their effectiveness.
(b) Determ ine that the peer review committee is as
certaining that firms are taking appropriate action
as a result of peer reviews.
(c) Conduct continuing oversight of all other activities
of the section.
(d) Make recommendations to the executive committee
for improvements in the operations of the section.
(e) Publish an annual report and such other reports
as may be deemed necessary with respect to its
activities.
(f) Engage staff to assist in carrying out its functions.
(g) Have the right for any or all of its members to
attend any meetings of the executive committee.

VIII.

Peer Reviews
1. Review Requirements
Peer reviews of m ember firms shall be conducted every
three years or at such additional times as designated by
the executive committee (see Appendix C).
2. Peer Review Committee
(a) Composition and appointment
T he peer review committee shall be a continuing
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committee appointed by the executive committee
and shall consist of fifteen individuals selected from
member firms.
(b) Responsibilities and functions
T he peer review committee shall—
(1) Administer the program of peer reviews for
member firms.
(2) Establish standards for conducting reviews.
(3) Establish standards for reports on peer reviews
and publication of such reports.
(4) Recommend sanctions and other disciplinary
decisions (including whether the name of the
affected firm is published) to the executive
committee.
(5) Consult from time to time with the public
oversight board.
(6) Keep appropriate records of peer reviews which
have been conducted.
3. Peer Review Objectives
T h e objectives of peer reviews shall be to determ ine
that—
(a) Member firms, as distinguished from individuals,
are m aintaining and applying quality controls in
accordance with standards established by the AICPA
Quality Control Standards Committee. Reviews for
this purpose shall include a review of working
papers rather than specific “cases.” (The existence
of “cases” in a firm might raise questions concerning
its quality controls.)
(b) By reviewing the procedures of member firms, ap
propriate steps are being taken to gain proper as
surance about the quality of work done on those
portions of audits performed in other countries.
(c) Member firms are meeting membership require
ments.

IX.

Sanctions Against Firms
1. Authority to Impose Sanctions
T he executive committee shall have the authority to im
pose sanctions on member firms either on its own initia
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tive or on the basis of recommendations of the peer re
view committee and shall establish procedures designed
to assure due process to firms in connection with dis
ciplinary proceedings.
2. Types of Sanctions
T he following types of sanctions may be imposed on
member firms for failure to m aintain compliance with
the requirements for membership:
(a) R equire corrective measures by the firm including
consideration by the firm of appropriate actions
with respect to individual firm personnel.
(b) Additional requirem ents for continuing professional
education.
(c) Accelerated or special peer reviews.
(d) Admonishments, censures, or reprimands.
(e) Monetary fines.
(f) Suspension from membership.
(g) Expulsion from membership.

X.

Financing and Staffing of Section
1. Section Staff and Meeting Costs
(a) T h e president of the AICPA shall appoint a staff
director and assign such other staff as may be re
quired by the section.
(b) T he cost of the section staff and normal meeting
costs shall be paid out of the general budget of the
AICPA.
2. Public Oversight Board and Special Projects
(a)
(b)

XI.

T he costs of the public oversight board and its staff
shall be paid out of the dues of the section.
T h e cost of special projects shall be paid out of the
dues of the section.

Relationship to Other AICPA Segments
N othing in the organizational structure and functions of this
section shall be construed as taking the place of or changing
the operations of existing senior committees of the AICPA
or the status of individual CPAs as members of the AICPA.
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APPENDIX A— Executive Recruiting and Insurance
Actuarial Services
Executive Recruiting Services
T he hiring of persons for managerial, executive, or director
positions is a function that is properly the client’s responsibility.
Accordingly, the member firm’s role in this function should be
limited. In serving an audit client whose securities are registered
with the SEC (including subsidiaries and affiliates of such clients),
a member firm should not
1. Accept an engagement to search for, or seek out, prospective
candidates for managerial, executive, or director positions with
its audit clients. This would not preclude giving the name of a
prospective candidate known to someone in the member firm,
provided such knowledge was not obtained as a result of the
performance of executive recruiting services for another client.
2. Engage in psychological testing, other formal testing or evalua
tion programs, or undertake reference checks of prospective
candidates for an executive or director position.
3. Act as a negotiator on the client’s behalf; for example, in deter
m ining position status or title, compensation, fringe benefits,
or other conditions of employment.
4. Recommend, or advise the client to hire, a specific candidate for
a specific job. However, a member firm may, upon request by
the client, interview candidates and advise the client on the
candidate’s competence for financial, accounting, administrative,
or control positions.
W hen a client seeks to fill a position within its organization
that is related to its system of accounting, financial, or administrative
controls, the client will frequently approach employees of the
member firm directly as candidates or seek referral of the member
firm’s employees who may be considering employment outside of
the profession. Such employment from time to time is an inevit
able consequence of the training and experience that the public
accounting profession provides to its staff, is beneficial to all con
cerned, including society in general, and therefore is not proscribed.
Insurance Actuarial Services
Actuarial skills are both accounting and auditing related. T he
bodies of knowledge supporting the actuarial and accounting pro
fessions have a substantial degree of overlap. Both professions in
volve the analysis of various factors of time, probability, and eco
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nomics and the quantification of such analysis in financial terms.
T he results of their work are significantly interrelated. T he pro
fessions are logical extensions of each other; indeed, they have been
practiced jointly for many years and even shared the same pro
fessional society in Scotland prior to their becoming established
in the United States.
T he work of actuarial specialists generally is necessary to obtain
audit satisfaction in support of insurance policy and loss reserves.
T o assist them in meeting their audit responsibilities, a num ber
of CPA firms have hired qualified actuaries of their own.
T he actuarial function is basic to the operation and manage
ment of an insurance company. Management’s responsibility for
this function cannot be assumed by the CPA firm without jeopard
izing the CPA firm’s independence. Because of the special sig
nificance of a CPA firm’s appearance of independence when auditing
publicly held insurance companies—
1. T he CPA firm should not render actuarially oriented advisory
services involving the determ ination of policy reserves and re
lated accounts to its audit clients unless such clients use their
own actuaries or third-party actuaries to provide management
with the primary actuarial capabilities. This does not pre
clude the use of the CPA firm’s actuarial staff in connection
with the auditing of such reserves.
2. Whenever the CPA firm renders actuarially oriented advisory
services, it must satisfy itself that it is acting in an advisory
capacity and that the responsibility for any significant actuarial
methods and assumptions is accepted by the client.
3. T he CPA firm should not render actuarially oriented advisory
services when the CPA firm’s involvement is continuous because
such a relationship might be perceived as an engagement to per
form a management function.
Subject to the above limitations, it is appropriate for the CPA
firm to render certain actuarially oriented advisory services to its
audit clients. Such services include:
1. Assisting management to develop appropriate methods, assump
tions, and amounts for policy and loss reserves and other actuarial
items presented in financial reports based on the company’s
historical experience, current practice, and future plans.
2. Assisting management in the conversion of financial statements
from a statutory basis to one conforming with generally accepted
accounting principles.
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3. Analyzing actuarial considerations and alternatives in federal
income tax planning.
4. Assisting management in the financial analyses of various matters
such as proposed new policies, new markets, business acquisitions,
and reinsurance needs.

(Approved by the executive committee June 21, 1979.)
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APPENDIX B— Resolution Establishing the Special
Investigations Committee
WHEREAS: T he objectives of the SEC practice section include
the improvement of the quality of practice by CPA firms before
the SEC through the establishment of practice requirem ents for
member firms, and the establishment and maintenance of an effec
tive system of self-regulation of member firms by various means
including the imposition of sanctions for failure to meet member
ship requirements; and
WHEREAS: T h e executive committee is authorized to carry
out the activities of the section and to receive, evaluate, and act
upon complaints received with respect to actions of member firms,
impose sanctions and establish procedures designed to assure due
process to firms in connection with disciplinary proceedings, and
appoint persons to serve on such committees and task forces as are
necessary to carry out its functions;
IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED T H A T :
T here is hereby established a special investigations committee
consisting of nine partners or retired partners of different mem
ber firms who, under procedures established by the executive
committee, shall make such investigation as it considers nec
essary to (a) determ ine whether facts relating to alleged audit
failures (1) indicate a possible need for corrective measures
by the member firm involved, (2) indicate that changes in
generally accepted auditing standards or quality control stand
ards need to be considered, or (3) indicate that sanctions should
be imposed on the member firm involved, and (b) recommend
to the executive committee such actions as are deemed ap
propriate.

(Approved by the executive committee August 7, 1979.)
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APPENDIX C— Timing off Peer Reviews and
Filing of Reports
T h e executive committee has established the following time
table according to which member firms must have their initial peer
reviews completed.
Initial Peer Review
Must Be Completed

Calendar Year Firm
Joins the Section

December 31, 19801
December 31, 1981
December 31, 1981
One year from the
date the firm joins
the section.

1978
1979
1980
1981 and subsequent
calendar years

A member firm’s subsequent peer reviews must be completed
by the end of the third calendar year following the calendar year
that included the previous review year-end. Although it is expected
that a firm ordinarily will not change its review year-end, a firm
may do so w ithout the peer review committee's prior approval, pro
vided that the new review year-end is not beyond three months of
the previous review year-end and provided that the peer review
is completed in accordance with the requirem ent in the preceding
sentence.
T h e review team’s report on the peer review is to be filed with
the peer review committee promptly (but no later than sixty days)
after the completion of the peer review. T h e report should be
accompanied, if applicable, by the quality control review panel’s
report, the review team’s letter of comments on matters that may
require action by the reviewed firm, and the reviewed firm’s response
to that letter. Upon application by a member firm, the peer review
committee may grant one sixty-day extension for filing the report.

(Approved by the executive committee June 21, 1979.)

1 Certain randomly selected member firms with less than five SEC clients will be
granted an extension until December 31, 1981, to have their initial peer review
completed. The purpose of this extension is to equalize the number of peer
reviews to achieve an appropriately balanced work load.
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APPENDIX D— Definition of an SEC Engagement
For purposes of im plem enting the membership requirem ents
of section IV 3(e) and (f) of the organizational structure and
functions document with respect to partner rotation and concurring
review, the executive committee has defined an SEC engagement as
the examination of the financial statements of
1. An issuer making an initial filing, including amendments, under
the Securities Act of 1933.
2. Registrants that file periodic reports (for example, Forms N-1R
and 10-K) with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
under the Investment Company Act of 1940 or the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (except brokers or dealers registered only
because of section 15 (a) of that a c t).
W hen an existing audit engagement becomes an SEC engage
ment, time served as partner in charge of the engagement before it
became an SEC engagement is to be considered in applying the fiveyear partner rotation requirem ent. However, the incum bent partner
may serve as partner in charge of the engagement for two consecu
tive annual examinations subsequent to the date of the latest annual
audited financial statements included in the filing.
Examples of entities that are not encompassed by the above defi
nition include
1. Banks and other lending institutions that file periodic reports
with the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Sys
tem, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, or the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board, because the powers, functions, and
duties of the SEC to enforce its periodic reporting provisions are
vested, pursuant to section 12 (i) of that act, in those agencies.
2. Subsidiaries or investees (including regulation S-X rule 4-02 (e)
companies) of an entity encompassed by the definition of an SEC
engagement, which subsidiaries or investees are not themselves
entities encompassed by such definition, even though their finan
cial statements may be presented separately in parent an d /o r
investor companies’ filings under the 1934 act.
3. Companies whose financial statements appear in the annual
reports an d /o r proxy statements of investment funds because
they are sponsors or managers of such funds, provided they are
not themselves registrants required to file periodic reports under
the 1940 act or section 13 or 15 (d) of the 1934 act.
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T he executive committee has also authorized the foregoing
definition for purposes of determ ining the names of clients for
which a firm is the principal auditor of record and any changes of
such clients for which information is required (under the member
ship requirements) to be filed with the section for each fiscal year
of a U.S. member firm (see section IV 3 (g) of the organizational
structure and functions docum ent).
T h e foregoing definition of an SEC engagement is not intended
to change section VI 2 (c) of the organization structure and functions
document regarding the appointm ent of members to the executive
committee of the section.

(Approved by the executive committee October 25, 1978.)
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APPENDIX E— Scope of Concurring Review
A member firm of the SEC practice section agrees to ensure
that a concurring review of the audit report by a partner other than
the audit partner in charge of an SEC engagement is required
before issuance of an audit report on the financial statements of
an SEC registrant.1 This requirem ent also applies to the reissuance
of such an audit report.
T h e purpose of the review is to provide additional assurance
that (1) the financial statements are in conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles or other comprehensive basis of
accounting and (2) the firm’s report thereon is in accordance with
generally accepted auditing standards.
T he partner assigned as the concurring reviewer should make
an objective review of the significant accounting and auditing con
siderations influencing the firm's report. His responsibilities include
reading the financial statements and the firm’s report thereon. T he
concurring reviewer should be informed regarding significant
accounting, auditing, or reporting considerations.
T h e concurring partner may deem it necessary to review rele
vant working papers to understand significant accounting, auditing,
or reporting considerations.
If the concurring partner and the partner in charge of the
engagement have differing views regarding im portant matters, the
disagreement should be resolved in accordance with applicable
firm policy.2
T h e engagement files should contain evidence that the con
curring review was completed prior to the issuance of the firm’s
report.

(Approved by the executive committee October 25, 1978.)

1 The peer review committee may authorize alternative procedures when this
requirement cannot be met because of the size of the member firm.
2 See SAS no. 22, Planning and Supervision.
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Exhibit IV

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
SEC PRACTICE SECTION
1979-1980

Representatives of Firms That Audit 30 or More Registrants
Under Section 12 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
Representative

Firm Affiliation

Archibald E. MacKay, Chairman
Ivan O . Bull
George R. Catlett
Robert M. Coffman
Robert L. Ferst
W. Donald Georgen
Howard Groveman
Ray J. Groves
Walter E. Hanson
William S. Kanaga
William B. Keast
Bernard Z. Lee
Charles G. Steele
John W. Zick

Main Hurdman & Cranstoun
McGladrey, Hendrickson & Co.
Arthur Andersen & Co.
Fox & Company
Laventhol & Horwath
Touche Ross & Co.
Alexander Grant & Company
Ernst & Whinney
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
Arthur Young & Co.
Coopers & Lybrand
Seidman & Seidman
Deloitte Haskins & Sells
Price Waterhouse & Co.

Representatives of Firms That Audit Fewer Than 30 Registrants
Under Section 12 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
Representative

Firm Affiliation

Peter Arnstein
Robert R. Harden
Raymond L. Hellmuth
Irving S. Kroll
John J. van Benten
Bert B. Weinstein
Gary J. Wolfe

John F. Forbes & Company
Clarkson, Harden & Gantt
Meahl, McNamara & Co.
Kenneth Leventhal & Co.
Geo. S. Olive & Co.
Altschuler, Melvoin & Glasser
Cherry, Bekaert & Holland
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Exhibit V

THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS COMMITTEE
OF THE SEC PRACTICE SECTION OF THE
AICPA DIVISION FOR CPA FIRMS

November 29, 1979
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FOREWORD

This document sets forth the procedure established by the
executive committee to govern the operations of the Special Inves
tigations Committee of the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA
Division for CPA Firms.

The Special Investigations Committee was

formed pursuant to a resolution of the Section's executive com
mittee that has been published as Appendix B to the Organizational
Structure and Functions document of the Section.
A separate document, Rules of Procedure for the Imposition of
Sanctions, sets forth procedures established by the executive com
mittee that are designed to assure due process to firms in connection
with all proceedings related to the imposition of sanctions under
taken by the Section.
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I. Objectives
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.

Committee Structure and Procedures
General Considerations
Information to be Reported to and Screened by
the Committee
Coordination with the Professional Ethics Division
Screening Procedures
Monitoring Procedures
Investigations —

General

Policies

IX. Investigations of MemberFirms
X. Investigations of Cases
XI.

Disposition of Cases
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THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS COMMITTEE
OF THE SEC PRACTICE SECTION OF THE
AICPA DIVISION FOR CPA FIRMS
I.

OBJECTIVES
The Special Investigations Committee (the "Committee") has

been established by the executive committee of the SEC Practice
Section in recognition of the significant public interest in
matters concerning the practice of public accounting that have
a bearing on the reliability of financial statements of SEC
registrants.

Those matters relate to such considerations as the

adequacy of generally accepted auditing standards and quality
control standards, compliance by member firms with those standards
in the conduct of their accounting and audit practice and, when
necessary, the imposition of sanctions on member firms.
The Section has established membership requirements that
provide, among other things, for a peer review of each member
firm's accounting and audit practice at least every three years
and that empower the executive committee to impose sanctions on
member firms for failure to meet the membership requirements.
The Committee's primary objectives are as follows:
1. Assist in providing reasonable assurance to the
public and to the profession that member firms are
complying with professional standards in the conduct
of their practice before the Securities and Exchange
Commission by identifying corrective measures, if any,
that should be taken by a member firm involved in a
specific alleged audit failure.

63

2. Assist in improving the quality of practice by member
firms before the Securities and Exchange Commission by
determining whether facts relating to specific alleged
audit failures indicate that changes in generally accepted
auditing standards or quality control standards need to be
considered.
3. Recommend to the executive committee, when deemed
necessary, appropriate sanctions with respect to the
member firms involved.

II.

COMMITTEE STRUCTURE AND PROCEDURES
The Committee structure and procedures shall be as follows:
1. The Committee shall be composed of nine members who
are partners or retired partners of different member firms.
Committee members shall be appointed by the executive com
mittee, with one member being designated as the chairman
by the executive committee.
2. The term of each Committee member shall be three years,
with initial terms staggered to provide for three expira
tions at the end of each of the first three years.
3. Members of the Committee shall be eligible to serve
only two three-year terms in addition to a partial term in
the beginning or to the unexpired portion of a term.
4. Committee members shall not serve concurrently as a
member of the Committee and of either the executive committee
or the peer review committee.
5. A majority of the Committee members must be present to
constitute a quorum.
(With respect to a quorum for a hearing,
see section 4.2(c) of the Rules of Procedure for the Imposi
tion of Sanctions.)
6. A member of the Committee shall be excluded from all
deliberations with respect to his firm or, if he has or
believes he has a conflict of interest, with respect to any
other firm (see section 3.11 of Rules of Procedure for the
Imposition of Sanctions).
7. Affirmative votes of a majority of the Committee members
eligible to vote shall be required for action on all matters
relating to specific member firms. If less than five Committee
members are eligible to vote on such a matter, the executive
committee shall appoint an additional member(s) to the Com
mittee, who shall be a partner or retired partner of a member
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firm that is not represented on the Committee, who shall
not be concurrently a member of the executive committee
or the peer review committee, and whose responsibilities
and authority shall be restricted to the matter involving
the specific member firm. On matters not involving speci
fic member firms, such as administrative and procedural
matters, a majority of the Committee members present at a
meeting and voting shall be required for action.
8. The meetings and proceedings of the Committee and any
of its task forces and all related information available
to the Committee and any of its task forces shall be treated
as confidential, except that the executive committee may
authorize public disclosure of information with respect to
any investigation or sanction.
9. The Committee's files and its meetings shall be open at
all times to members of the Public Oversight Board and its
representatives on a confidential basis, except that, after
giving the firm concerned an opportunity to present its views
and after consultation with the executive committee, the Public
Oversight Board may make public disclosure of information
thus obtained which it deems necessary in the interest of the
profession or the public.
The Committee shall have whatever staff it needs to perform its
functions.

III.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
In carrying out its duties, the Committee shall give primary

consideration to the significant interests of the public as outlined
in section I, and shall also seek to deal fairly with the legitimate
interests of member firms.

In this connection, the Committee shall

take into consideration in deciding upon its course of action that
substantial incentives are already in place for a firm and individuals
in such firm to adhere to professional standards in the performance
of the audit function, including penalties and publicity resulting
from court and SEC actions, sanctions resulting from peer reviews
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pursuant to membership requirements of the Section, and dis
ciplinary proceedings against individuals by the AICPA and
state professional societies and boards. It shall also consider
both the importance to the public interest of having a prompt
investigation and the fact that substantial prejudice to a
firm or individuals in that firm could occur if the Committee
were to commence and continue an investigation while the firm
or individuals in it are involved, or about to be involved, in
a court proceeding or a proceeding or investigation by the SEC,
a grand jury, or other governmental body.
A firm shall cooperate in furnishing information to the
Committee and in any investigation of the firm or of the case
initiated by the Committee unless it can demonstrate to the sat
isfaction of the Committee (a) that pending litigation or other
proceeding or investigation

is directly related to the subject

of the inquiry and that there is a likelihood that such litiga
tion, proceeding or investigation will be unduly influenced by
the firm's providing the requested information and (b) that the
need for such information as of the date requested is not suf
ficient to override the interest of the firm or individuals in
avoiding prejudice in such litigation or other proceeding or
investigation.

Also, the firm has no obligation to provide the

Committee with information that would invade the attorney-client
or other privilege or the litigation work product of the firm or
any of its partners or employees.
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IV. INFORMATION TO BE REPORTED TO AND SCREENED BY THE COMMITTEE

All member firms shall report to the Committee, within 30 days
of service on them of the first pleading in the matter or within
30 days of joining the Section if later,1 any litigation (including
criminal indictments) against them or their personnel, or any
proceeding or investigation publicly announced by a regulatory
agency, commenced on or after November 1, 1979 (not including
additional proceedings arising out of or related to facts involved
in litigation originally filed prior to November 1, 1979), that
involves clients or former clients that are SEC registrants and that
alleges deficiencies in the conduct of an audit or reporting thereon
in connection with any required filing under the Federal securities
laws.2

The initial report shall identify the litigation and be

accompanied by copies of the complaints or indictment or other
charges filed with the courts involved.
With respect to matters reported under the requirements of the
preceding paragraph, member firms shall report to the Committee
additional proceedings, settlements, court decisions on substantive
issues, and the filing of appeals within 30 days of their occurrence.
Member firms may also report such other information with respect to
such matters as they consider appropriate.

1

Since the Committee is not expected to be appointed before December
1979, the first report by member firms is to be filed by January 31,
1980.
An
2 allegation in such formal litigation, proceeding or investigation that
a member firm or its personnel have violated the Federal securities
laws in connection with services other than an audit for an SEC regi
strant shall be reported and is included in the definition of "case."
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The term "case," as used hereinafter, refers to an engagement
or engagements with respect to which there are allegations that a
member firm with respect to a report or reports on the financial
statements or related financial data of an SEC registrant failed to
observe generally accepted auditing standards, whether or not liti
gation is involved.3 Hereinafter, the term "firm" refers to a member
firm.
The Committee shall screen information that comes to its atten
tion through (a) the reporting requirement referred to above, or
(b)

other sources when the cases are determined by the Committee to

be of sufficient public interest, provided such cases do not involve
litigation commenced prior to November 1, 1979.
The procedures for reporting litigation by each firm shall be
reviewed in the triennial peer reviews.

Also, the Committee's staff

shall review compliance with the reporting requirements by monitoring
published accounts of litigation that are available to it.

V.

COORDINATION WITH THE PROFESSIONAL ETHICS DIVISION
The Committee shall prepare, in cooperation with the profes

sional ethics executive committee, and submit to the SEC Practice
Section's executive committee for approval, a memorandum setting
forth the policies and procedures to be followed in coordinating
the activities of the Committee with those of the committees of
the Professional Ethics Division.

3

See footnote 2.
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VI.

SCREENING PROCEDURES

The Committee shall screen the information discussed in
section IV to determine whether (1) to monitor developments in
the case without investigation of the firm or the case, pending
the conclusion of litigation or other proceeding or investigation;
(2) to investigate the firm without investigating the case;
(3) to recommend investigation of the case to the executive com
mittee; and/or (4) to close its files on the case.

Such deter

minations may be changed from time to time as a result of informa
tion available t o the Committee.
In deciding what action to take or recommend, the Committee
shall consider such available relevant information as is needed to
make such a decision, including the date and results of the most
recent peer review of the firm and when the next peer review is
scheduled.

The Committee may request additional information from

the firm, or have one or more representatives visit the firm, to
obtain such additional information as could reasonably be expected
to be a part of the screening process.
The Committee shall complete its original screening of informa
tion with respect to a case expeditiously, ordinarily within 90 days
of the date of the first Committee meeting after the case has first
been reported, unless additional time is reasonably required.

VII.

MONITORING PROCEDURES
When the Committee monitors developments in a case without

investigation of the firm or the case, it shall consider any new
information it receives to determine whether to continue the
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monitoring, to initiate an investigation of the firm, to recommend
an investigation of the case to the executive committee, or to close
its files on the case.

VIII.

INVESTIGATIONS— GENERAL POLICIES
The purpose of an investigation of a firm or of a case shall be

to determine whether one or more of the following conditions exist:
1. Quality controls are inadequate in a firm (including any
segment, such as an office or a specialized industry practice).
2. There has been a material departure from generally
accepted auditing standards or a material failure to
comply with quality control standards by the individuals
responsible for the engagement in question (such indi
viduals ordinarily being limited to the partner and manager
on the engagement and other partners involved in decisions
affecting the engagement).
3. There is a need for reconsidering the adequacy of cer
tain generally accepted auditing standards or quality control
standards.
The Committee shall establish the scope of any investigation
of a firm undertaken without investigating the case itself (see
section IX).

The executive committee shall establish the general

scope of any investigation of a case (see section X).

While the

persons responsible for the investigation may carry out some of
the procedures that might be included in a peer review, such an
investigation should not be as extensive as a peer review of the
firm conducted in accordance with the Section's Standards for
Performing and Reporting on Quality Control Compliance Reviews.
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Depending upon the extent and complexity of the investiga
tion, a Committee member may perform it with the assistance of the
Committee staff, or a task force may be appointed by the Committee
to perform it.

(A Committee member who conducts an investigation

is precluded from serving as a member of a hearing body with respect
to that case.)

If a task force is appointed, it generally would be

comprised of three or five partners or retired partners of firms,
with the number and background of its members dependent on the
complexity of the matter under investigation.

The member firm

being investigated shall be advised of the names of the members of
the task force and their firms.

If there is a possible conflict of

interest, the member firms shall have the opportunity to request
reconsideration of any proposed task force member.
Upon completion of its investigation, the task force (or
such other persons who may conduct an investigation) shall submit
its findings and recommendations to the Committee, which shall
consider such findings and recommendations and determine what
action is appropriate.

If the Committee concludes that it will

conduct a hearing to consider whether to recommend sanctions, it
shall notify the firm in the manner prescribed in the Rules of
Procedure for the Imposition of Sanctions.
If the Committee concludes that certain generally accepted
auditing standards or quality control standards may need to be
modified, it shall recommend to the executive committee that the
matter be referred to the appropriate AICPA technical committee for
action.
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The Committee shall consider corrective measures voluntarily
taken by the firm with respect to its quality control policies and
procedures or its personnel in deciding what further action, if
any, should be taken.
If a firm fails to supply information to the Committee or its
representatives in accordance with the procedures specified herein,
such failure shall constitute a basis on which the Committee may
recommend to the executive committee that sanctions be imposed on
the firm.

The Committee shall hold a hearing in accordance with

the Section's Rules of Procedure for the Imposition of Sanctions to
determine whether the firm has failed to supply information reasonably
requested of it and what sanction should be recommended.

IX.

INVESTIGATIONS OF MEMBER FIRMS
Following screening or monitoring, the Committee may decide

to investigate a firm without investigating the case.

Such an

investigation could include, for example, one or more of the
following:
1. A review of certain of the firm's quality control
policies and procedures, or a review of compliance with
those policies and procedures by certain offices or
individuals.
2. A review of other engagements performed by the firm's
office or offices or by the personnel involved in the case
or of other engagements in the same industry as in the case.
3. Interviews of the firm's personnel with functional
responsibility for a specialized industry if the case
involves such an industry.
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Consideration shall also be given to any corrective action
the firm has taken, including any action with respect to indi
viduals involved in the case.

X.

INVESTIGATIONS OF CASES
Following screening, monitoring, or investigation of a member

firm, the Committee may decide to recommend that the executive
committee authorize an investigation of the case.

However, the

Committee will not ordinarily recommend that the executive com
mittee authorize an investigation of a case that is the subject of
a court proceeding or a proceeding or investigation by the SEC, a
grand jury, or other governmental body until such matters are con
cluded.

During that period, the Committee may monitor developments

or make an investigation of the firm, without investigating the
case.

In determining whether there should be an investigation of

the case after litigation is concluded, the Committee and the
executive committee may consider whether the public interest has
been safeguarded in other ways.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Committee may decide that
particular cases are of such significance to the public interest
that the importance of investigation of the case outweighs any
possible prejudice to the firm and that such an investigation should
not be deferred.

In such an instance, the Committee shall request

an authorization from the executive committee before proceeding to
investigate the case.

73

Before recommending to the executive committee that an
investigation of a case be instituted, the Committee shall advise
the firm of its intention to make such a recommendation and shall
give the firm (through counsel or otherwise) an opportunity to
present its views in writing as to whether such recommendation
is appropriate in the circumstances.

If the recommendation is

made to the executive committee, the firm shall be given an
opportunity to express its views in writing to the executive com
mittee.
When an investigation of a case has been authorized by the
executive committee, the Committee shall proceed promptly with
its investigation.

XI.

DISPOSITION OF CASES
The Committee shall submit periodic reports to the executive

committee concerning cases on its agenda.
The Committee may close its files on a case whenever it
concludes that further action by it is not necessary, except in
the following instance.

When the executive committee has authorized

an investigation of a case, only the executive committee can auth
orize that the files on the case be closed.
The Committee shall consider the need to recommend sanctions
to the executive committee when the Committee has found that
material departures from generally accepted auditing standards or
quality control standards have occurred, or when it has found that
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a firm has not been cooperative in providing information.

Such

sanctions shall be recommended only after findings have been made
in a hearing held in accordance with the Section's Rules of Pro
cedure for the Imposition of Sanctions.
One or more of the following sanctions may be recommended for
a firm:
1. Requirements for corrective measures not voluntarily
taken by the firm.
2. Additional requirements for continuing professional
education.
3. Special or accelerated peer review (the cost of which
is to be paid for by the firm being reviewed), with the
possibility of special attention being given to the quality
controls of the firm as they relate to particular offices
or individuals and with the peer review committee taking
whatever action it deems appropriate as a result of the
peer review under its administrative procedures.
4.

Admonishment, censure or reprimand.

5.

Monetary fine.

6.

Suspension from membership in the Section.

7.

Expulsion from membership in the Section.

The public file will include a copy of the documents setting
forth sanctions approved by the executive committee with respect
to member firms.
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Exhibit VI

SEC PRACTICE SECTION
AICPA DIVISION FOR CPA FIRMS

RULES OF PROCEDURE
FOR THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS

November

29,

11

1979

FOREWORD

This manual of rules of procedure has been prepared for
the use of members of certain committees of the SEC Practice
Section of the AICPA Division for CPA Firms in connection with
proceedings related to the imposition of sanctions under section
IX of the Organizational Structure and Functions document of the
section. The affected committees are the executive committee,
the special investigations committee, and the peer review com
mittee. It has also been prepared for the information of those
member firms that may be a party to such a proceeding.
The procedures described in this manual are significantly
different from those in a proceeding at law. Hearings conducted
under these procedures are, for the most part, informal in nature.
The formal rules of evidence do not apply.
The overriding objective of this manual is to provide for an
orderly proceeding, achieve a fair result, and adequately safeguard
the rights of member firms and individuals that may become a party
to a proceeding.
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81

1.

1.1

GENERAL

Authority to Conduct Proceedings
The executive committee of the section is authorized (a) to

impose sanctions on member firms either on its own initiative or
on the basis of recommendations of the peer review committee or
the special investigations committee and (b) to establish pro
cedures designed to assure due process to firms in connection
with proceedings related to the imposition of sanctions (herein
after, "proceedings").

The peer review committee and the special

investigations committee cannot impose sanctions; they can only
make recommendations to the executive committee as to the sanctions
that they believe should be imposed.

1.2

Use of Hearings
Proceedings conducted by components of the SEC Practice Section

of the AICPA Division for CPA Firms involve formal hearings which
enable the member firm to challenge or contest the charges or recom
mendations being made.

1.3

Applicability of Rules of Procedure
The rules of procedure set forth in this manual become applicable:
(a)

When the peer review committee or the special investi
gations committee decides that it will conduct a hearing
to consider whether to recommend to the executive com
mittee the imposition of sanctions on a member firm.

(b)

When the executive committee decides that it will conduct
a hearing to consider imposing sanctions on a member firm.
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For purposes of these rules of procedure, sanctions that
may be imposed on member firms are described in section IX.2 of
the section's Organizational Structure and Functions document.
Once these rules of procedure become applicable to a pro
ceeding, they are to be applied until a decision by the executive
committee to impose sanctions becomes effective or the matter is
otherwise disposed of.

1.4

Nature of Hearings
Hearings before the peer review committee, the special investi

gations committee, and the executive committee (hereinafter the
"hearing bodies") are designed to assist those bodies in developing
sufficient facts on which to base a decision as to whether or not
the imposition of sanctions or a recommendation to impose sanctions
is appropriate in a particular case.

Hearing procedures are informal

to afford all parties maximum flexibility in presenting every side of
an issue.

Member firms may be represented by counsel.

No hearings

before hearing bodies shall be open to the public (see section 3.8).

1.5

Role of the Hearing Body
The hearing body determines whether or not sanctions should be

imposed or recommended, as applicable.

The hearing body consists of

the respective committee sitting en banc unless for good reason one
or more members of the respective committee are unable to sit or it
is inappropriate for a member to hear and decide a particular case
(see section 3.11); hearings shall not be conducted by panels or by
hearing officers appointed for that purpose.
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1.6

Parties to the Proceeding

Only the affected firm and components of the SEC Practice
Section are parties to the proceeding.

Intervention by third

parties in proceedings shall not be permitted.

2.
2.1

THE RIGHTS OF PARTIES

Right to Appear
A party to a proceeding has the right to appear and be heard

at a hearing.

A member firm may be represented by counsel or other

representatives.

A hearing body is empowered to conduct a hearing

in the absence of a representative of the member firm, provided that
a Notice of Hearing has been properly served, the representative of
the member firm has failed to appear at the hearing without good
reason, and there is no compelling reason, in the view of the hearing
body, not to proceed.

2.2

Right to Present Evidence and to Cross-Examine
A party to a proceeding has the following rights in a hearing:

2.3

(a)

To present evidence.

(b)

To present arguments on issues relevant to the
subject of the proceeding.

(c)

To cross-examine witnesses present at the hearing.

Right to Copy of Testimony
A member firm that is a party to a proceeding may purchase a

copy of the transcript of the hearing.
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Any person who gives evidence

as a witness may purchase a copy of the transcript of his
testimony.

The fee for photocopying the transcript will be

determined from time to time by AICPA staff.

3.
3.1

BASIC PRINCIPLES

Purpose of Rules of Procedure
Although hearings conducted by the hearing bodies are

informal, these rules of procedure have been adopted to insure
fairness during the orderly disposition of proceedings before
hearing bodies.

3.2

Rules of Evidence
In hearings governed by these rules of procedure, the formal

rules of evidence applicable to proceedings at law or in equity do
not apply, and evidence that would be inadmissable in a court of
law may be received so long as it is relevant in the discretion of
the presiding officer after due consideration of any objection by
any party.

The hearing body shall determine the weight to be given

to such evidence.

3.3

Notification of Proceeding
Designated staff shall provide a member firm that is named as

a party to a proceeding adequate notice of such proceeding by causing
to be mailed to the member firm:
(a)

Within 10 days after a hearing body decides that
it will conduct a hearing (except hearings to be
conducted by the executive committee to consider
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recommendations of other hearing bodies), an "Advice
of Proceeding" stating that it has been determined
that a hearing should be held, describing the charges
that caused the hearing to be authorized, indicating
the approximate date on which briefs and memoranda will
be mailed to the member firm, and affording the member
firm a reasonable time (not more than 60 days from the
date of mailing) to respond, if the firm so desires.
The hearing body may determine after a response is made
that a hearing would be inappropriate or unnecessary and
terminate the matter at that time.
(b)

At least 45 days prior to a proposed hearing date of any
hearing body, a "Notice of Hearing" which shall contain
a description of the matters to be dealt with at the
hearing, the time and place of the hearing, and which
shall be accompanied by a copy of all briefs and memoranda
to be presented at the hearing in support of the charges
or recommendations, as applicable, and by a list of the
names and addresses of all witnesses, if any, scheduled
to be called by the staff or other individuals with
responsibility for presenting the charges or recommenda
tions to the hearing body.

Such Advice or Notice, when mailed by registered mail, postage
prepaid, addressed to the managing partner (chief executive officer)
of the member firm at its last known business address as reflected
in the section's public files, shall be deemed to be properly served.
A copy of these rules of procedure shall accompany all Advices and
Notices.

3.4

Answer to Notice of Hearing
The member firm is required to provide designated staff with

an answer in writing to a Notice of Hearing.

If mailed, such answer

must be mailed registered mail, postage prepaid, at least 17 days
before the hearing date specified in the notice.

If hand delivered,

delivery must be made to the AICPA offices at least 14 days before
the hearing date specified in the notice.
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(A member firm is not

required to answer an Advice of Proceeding.)

The answer may be

in the form of a reply memorandum to the briefs and memoranda
accompanying the Notice of Hearing, or a request for postpone
ment that states the reason for the request (see sections 3.5 and
3.6).

3.5

Briefs and Memoranda
The staff or other individuals responsible for presenting the

charges to a hearing body shall prepare a hearing memorandum and
necessary appendices thereto containing the material upon which
they intend to rely at the hearing.
The member firm shall furnish a reply memorandum to designated
staff at least 14 days (or if mailed, 17 days) before (a) the hearing
date specified in the Notice of Hearing or (b) such date as may be
set after postponement of a hearing.

The reply memorandum may con

tain a denial of some or all of the charges, an explanation of some
or all of the facts described in the hearing memorandum, any defenses
being asserted, and any other information deemed relevant by the
member firm.

The reply memorandum shall contain a list of the names

and addresses of all witnesses scheduled to be called by the member
firm.
All material furnished to the hearing body shall be reproduced
on

8½ x

11 paper, insofar as possible, by any standard duplicating

process that provides legible copies.
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3.6

Postponements

At any time prior to the time set for the hearing, the pre
siding officer of the hearing body is empowered to postpone the
hearing.

He shall, within 10 days from the date postponement is

granted, reschedule the hearing.

A postponement is not a matter

of right and will be granted only upon the showing of good and
sufficient reason.
A hearing body, when in actual session for the purpose of
hearing a case, may postpone the hearing and designate a new date
upon a showing of good cause.

Such action shall be taken as a body

and by majority vote.
Denial of postponement is not subject to an appeal to any
other component of the section or of the AICPA which would pre
vent or delay the holding of the hearing.

However, this shall

not prevent a member firm whose request for postponement is denied
by the special investigations committee or by the peer review com
mittee from asserting as a basis for rejecting the recommendations of
such committee at any subsequent hearing before the executive com
mittee that its rights were prejudiced by the denial of its request
for a postponement.

3.7

Witnesses
Both the representatives of the member firm and the staff or

other individuals with responsibility for presenting the charges to
a hearing body may produce such witnesses as they deem appropriate.
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On motion of either of the parties to the proceeding, or of
any member of the hearing body, witnesses will be excluded from
a hearing except during such time as they are actually giving
testimony.

3.8

Witnesses at a hearing will not be sworn.

Confidentiality of Proceedings
No hearings before hearing bodies shall be open to the public.

Briefs, memoranda, documentary evidence adduced at hearings, and
stenographic transcripts of hearings shall be available for the
confidential information of the following interested parties only
except as otherwise provided in section 2.3:
(a)

The parties to the proceeding.

(b)

The executive committee of the SEC Practice Section.

(c)

The Public Oversight Board or its representatives.

Members of hearing bodies, staff, parties to the proceeding,
and witnesses should be appropriately advised of the need to
maintain confidentiality.
Notwithstanding the above, after giving the firm concerned an
opportunity to present its views and after consultation with the
executive committee, the Public Oversight Board may make public
disclosure of information thus obtained which it deems necessary
in the interest of the profession or the public.
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3.9

Full Hearing

Normally, once a hearing body is convened and assembled to
hear a case, every effort will be made to reach a decision while
it is convened and all parties shall be prepared to present their
full case at that time.

However, a member firm shall have the

opportunity, if it so requests, to submit post-hearing briefs or
memoranda within 10 days of the completion of a hearing.

In such

circumstances, or with the consent of the presiding officer, the
staff or other individuals with responsibility for presenting the
charges to the hearing body also may submit post-hearing briefs
or memoranda.

3.10

Public Disclosure of Sanctions
When a decision is made by the executive committee to impose

sanctions pursuant to section IX of the section's Organizational
Structure and Functions document, the executive committee shall
decide, by a majority of its members present and voting, on the
form of the notice of the case and the decision to be published,
along with the name of the member firm, in a membership periodical
of the Institute.

No such public disclosure shall be made until

a decision to impose sanctions has become effective.
Information in the section's nonpublic files concerning matters
that are the subject of pending proceedings, matters that may result
in initiation of a proceeding, and matters referred to other com
ponents of the AICPA, are to be held in confidence.
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However, the

executive committee may authorize public disclosure of information
with respect to the existence of an investigation or the imposition
of a sanction.

3.11

Disqualification of Committee Members from Participation in
a Proceeding
The following preclude a committee member from participating in

any part of a proceeding:
(a)

The committee member's firm has performed the most
recent peer review of the affected member firm's
accounting and audit practice or the committee member
has served on a review team or on a quality control
review panel in connection with the affected member
firm's most recent peer review.

(b)

The committee member's firm has performed a peer review
of the affected member firm's accounting and audit
practice for a year coinciding with or preceding
(depending on the timing of the triennial reviews)
the year in which a significant audit failure or
other identifiable incident that is the subject of
the proceeding is alleged to have taken place or the
committee member served on a review team or on a quality
control review panel in connection with such a peer
review.

(c)

The committee member's firm is the subject of the proceeding.

(d)

The committee member believes he could not be impartial
and objective with respect to the charges or has a con
flict of interest.
(A committee member who conducts an
investigation and/or presents charges to a hearing body
is precluded from serving as a member of a hearing body
with respect to that case.)

For purposes of this

section,

a retired partner of a member firm

shall be considered in the same category as an active partner for a
period of three years after retirement.
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3.12

Hearing by the Executive Committee to Consider Findings
of Another Hearing Body
The executive committee shall be convened as a hearing body

to consider sanctions recommended by the peer review committee or
the special investigations committee.

At such hearing, the exec

utive committee shall consider the entire record of the original
hearing body together with such new relevant evidence or addi
tional memoranda as the member firm may desire to bring before
it.

A summary of such new evidence and any additional memoranda

shall be filed with the member firm's answer to the Notice of
Hearing (see section 3.4).

The record also may be supplemented by

any additional evidence which the chairman of the executive com
mittee considers to be relevant and of sufficient importance to
merit consideration or review.

3.13

Effective Date of Decisions
A decision by the executive committee to impose sanctions

shall

become effective as prescribed by the executive committee,

but within 15 to 30 days from the date of the decision.

4.

4.1

CONDUCTING A HEARING

Responsibilities of the Presiding Officer
The chairmen of the executive committee, the special investiga

tions committee and the peer review committee, respectively, serve
as the presiding officer when such committees assemble as hearing
bodies.
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If the chairman is disqualified from participation in the
proceeding, a presiding officer will be elected by majority vote
of the members present and voting.

The presiding officer is

authorized to hold conferences for the simplification or settle
ment of issues; take action necessary to maintain order; rule on
motions and procedural questions arising during the hearing; call
recesses or adjourn the hearing; examine witnesses; determine the
admissibility of evidence; and take such reasonable actions as
may be necessary to provide for a fair and orderly hearing.

4.2

Order of Proceedings —

Initial Hearing

The following is an outline of the order of proceedings for
a hearing under these rules.
(a)

The presiding officer calls the session to order,
appoints a secretary, and identifies the case by
name and number. He determines that a reporter is
present and prepared to make a stenographic record
of the hearing.

(b)

The presiding officer requests that the representa
tives of the member firm and counsel, if any, appear.

(c)

The secretary identifies the staff or other indi
viduals with responsibility for presenting the
charges to the hearing body, and counsel for the
section, if present, and the reporter. He calls
the roll of the members of the hearing body by
name and firm, identifying those members, if any,
who had disqualified themselves as members of a
hearing body on the specific case. The secretary
announces for the record whether a quorum is present,
a quorum of a hearing body being a majority of those
members of the respective committee who have not dis
qualified themselves from participating in the pro
ceeding, but not less than five.1

If less than five members of the special investigations committee
or the peer review committee, respectively, are eligible and able
to serve on a hearing body, the matter shall be referred to the
executive committee, which may appoint an individual(s) to serve
on the hearing body.
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(d)

If no representatives of the member firm are present,
the presiding officer may proceed if he determines on
the record that it is appropriate to do so.

(e)

The presiding officer states for the record a brief
summary of the subject of the hearing and the
authority for holding it.

(f)

The presiding officer states that the hearing will be
conducted under these rules of procedure, noting in
particular the informal nature of the hearing, especially
as it relates to rules of evidence, and the need to main
tain confidentiality.

(g)

The presiding officer allows the parties to the pro
ceeding to state for the record any objections they
have to any prehearing proceedings, such as service
of the Advice of Proceeding or Notice of Hearing, and
to make any prehearing motions they have, such as a
request for postponement (see section 3.6).

(h)

The presiding officer requests the parties to the pro
ceeding to identify their witnesses for the record.

(i)

The presiding officer requests the person representing
the SEC Practice Section, or counsel, to present the
evidence against the member firm. In the course of
this presentation, any exhibits to be introduced as
evidence are passed to the representative of the
member firm for inspection. They are then passed to the
presiding officer, who indicates orally whether they are
to be admitted. The presiding officer should see that
all documentary and physical evidence is marked for
identification and that a list is kept that describes
the exhibit and its identification.

(j)

The presiding officer permits the following individuals
to question witnesses called by the representatives of
the SEC Practice Section, or counsel, upon completion of
their testimony:
(i)
(ii)

(k)

The representative of the member firm, or
counsel.
Members of the hearing body.

The presiding officer requests the representative of
the member firm, or counsel, to present any evidence
in support of their defense, following the same pro
cedure in (i) above.
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(l)

The presiding officer permits the following individuals
to question witnesses called by the representative of
the member firm, or counsel, upon completion of their
testimony:
(i)
(ii)

4.3

The representative
or counsel.

of the SEC Practice Section,

Members of the hearing body.

(m)

The presiding officer permits the person presenting
evidence against the member firm to offer rebuttal
evidence.

(n)

The presiding officer permits the representative of
the member firm, or counsel, to make a closing state
ment which is then followed by the closing statement of
the person presenting evidence against the member firm.

(o)

If the member firm does not request the opportunity
to submit a post-hearing brief or memorandum (see
section 3.9), the presiding officer requests that all
individuals, other than the members of the hearing
body, retire from the hearing room.

(p)

The hearing body determines by majority vote in execu
tive session its disposition of the case by polling all
participating members, including the presiding officer
(see section 5). In the event the hearing body is
unable to reach a decision during the executive session,
it may adjourn the executive session to such later date
as it shall determine.

(q)

If a decision is reached immediately after the hearing,
all parties to the proceeding present prior to executive
session and the reporter are recalled for the purpose of
recording the decision. If a decision cannot be reached
immediately after the hearing or the parties are given
an opportunity to submit post-hearing briefs or memoranda,
the parties to the proceeding shall be informed of the
decision by letter mailed within 10 days of the decision
in the same manner as a Notice of Hearing (see section 3.3)

Order of Proceedings —
Hearing by the Executive Committee
to Consider Findings of Another Hearing Body
A hearing before the executive committee to consider the

recommendations of the peer review committee or the special
investigations committee with respect to sanctions that should
be imposed on a member firm shall be conducted substantially in
accordance with section 4.2.
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5.

5.1

THE HEARING BODY'S DECISION

Decisions to be Made
The hearing body must make the following determinations

based on the evidence presented at the hearing:

5.2

(a)

The facts in issue.

(b)

Whether the facts, as determined, support the
charges brought against the member firm.

(c)

Whether the charges brought are a violation of
the membership requirements.

(d)

Whether and what sanctions are appropriate.

(e)

What the effective date of the final decision should
be.

Burden of Proof
A determination that the facts support the charges brought

against the member firm must be based on the preponderance of
the evidence.
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Exhibit VII

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS COMMITTEE
SEC PRACTICE SECTION
1979-1980

Member

Firm or Former
Firm Affiliation

Rholan E. Larson,
Chairman

Partner, Larson, Allen,
Weishair & Co.

1982

Leroy Layton

Retired, former partner,
Main Hurdman & Cranstoun

1982

Partner, Price Waterhouse
& Co.

1982

Partner, Arthur Andersen
& Co.

1981

Retired, former partner,
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.

1981

Partner, McGladrey,
Hendrickson & Co.

1981

Partner, A. M. Pullen &
Company

1980

Retired, former partner,
Ernst & Whinney

1980

Retired, former partner,
Seidman & Seidman

1980

John B. O'Hara
Edwin P. Fisher
Leon P. Otkiss
David Wentworth
Harry L. Laing
Harry F. Reiss, Jr.
Lawrence J. Seidman

*Concides with date of AICPA annual meeting.
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Term
Expires*

Exhibit VIII
THE SEC PRACTICE SECTION OF THE
AICPA DIVISION FOR CPA FIRMS

POSITION PAPER OF TASK FORCE ON
CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE
AUDITOR'S WORK ENVIRONMENT

March 1980
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A IC P A

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas, New York, New York 10036 (212) 575-6200

March 17, 1980

To the Members of t h e :
AICPA Board of Directors
Public Oversight Board
Private Companies Practice Section
Executive Committee
Some months ago, the Executive Committee of the SEC Practice
Section appointed a task force to consider certain portions
of the Report of the Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities
related to certain aspects of the auditor's work environment.
The task force has prepared a position paper on that subject,
and the paper has been accepted by the Executive Committee.
The position paper has been distributed to the firms that are
members of the SEC Practice Section.
A copy of the paper,
together with a transmittal letter that summarizes its findings,
is enclosed for your information.
I would be happy to answer any questions you might have about
this position paper.
Sincerely,

A. E. MacKay
Chairman
SEC Practice Section
Executive Committee
AEM:jmk
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A IC P A

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas, New York, New York 10036 (212) 575-6200

March 17, 1980

To Managing Partners of
Member Firms of the
SEC Practice Section
Dear Colleague:
Enclosed is a copy of a position paper of the task force
appointed by the SEC Practice Section Executive Committee
to consider certain conclusions of the Commission on Audi
tor's Responsibilities (Cohen Commission). The position
paper, which has been accepted by the Executive Committee,
sets forth the task force's considerations and conclusions
about portions of the Cohen Commission's Report (the Report;
issued in 1978) that are related to the auditor's work
environment and that resulted, in part, from a profession
wide survey of selected partners and staff members of CPA
firms.
The position paper also sets forth recommendations
to firms about steps that they should take in response to
concerns expressed in the Report.
The Cohen Commission expressed concern about specific audit
practices that it believed cause or result from "excessive
time pressures."
Serious consideration must be given to
these concerns; but, in light of several factors relating
to the results of the Cohen Commission's survey and develop
ments in the profession (discussed in the position paper),
the task force believes that there is not persuasive evidence
that firms have sacrificed audit quality — because of time
pressures on audits or otherwise.
Furthermore, it believes
that those concerns are not as serious or pervasive as some
apparently have inferred from the Report and, most importantly,
that there are pervasive positive factors at work on audit
quality and specifically on those concerns.
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-2-

Accordingly, the task force recommends that firms should
continue to reassess, and otherwise monitor the effective
ness of, their policies and procedures on the use of time
budgets, the level of audit partner supervision, and the
signing off for audit work.
Feedback from firms' employees
to the partners would provide useful information for such
monitoring activities and might be obtained through various
means that ordinarily exist already within firms.
Accordingly,
the task force does not believe that a firm needs to conduct
an internal survey to obtain such feedback; however, some
firms might decide to do so.
I hope you will carefully consider this position paper.
ever, please note that it does not establish membership
requirements or peer review standards.
Sincerely,

A. E. MacKay
Chairman
SEC Practice Section
Executive Committee
AEM:jmk
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How

POSITION PAPER OF TASK FORCE ON
CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE
AUDITOR'S WORK ENVIRONMENT

1.

The SEC Practice Section of the AICPA Division for CPA

Firms appointed a task force to consider certain conclusions
of the Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities (Cohen
Commission) that were related to the auditor's work environ
ment.

This position paper sets forth the considerations,

conclusions, and recommendations of the task force with
respect to certain portions of the Cohen Commission's Report(
)
1
that are discussed in the Report's section, "Management
Policies and Procedures of Public Accounting Firms and Their
Effect on Independence."

COHEN COMMISSION REPORT

2.

The Cohen Commission studied, among other things,

aspects of the business environment that affect the indepen
dence of auditors.

The Cohen Commission concluded that

possible excessive competition, rather than lack of it,
appears to present a problem to the public accounting profes
sion today.

(1)

Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities, Report,
Conclusions and Recommendations (New York: AICPA,
1978) referred to herein as "Report."
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3.

In explaining that conclusion, the Cohen Commission

stated that its research on selected cases involving alleged
"audit failures," its conferences with SEC staff, technical
partners of CPA firms and others, and its survey of partners'
and staff members' attitudes "provide persuasive evidence
that time and budget pressures frequently cause substandard
auditing" (Report, p. 109).

The Cohen Commission's survey,
(2 )

frequently referred to as the "Rhode Survey," (2) was a
questionnaire sent to present and former partners and staff
members of auditing firms, principally to determine their
attitudes and practices related to the quality of their work
and independence.

Although a single cause of time and

budget pressures was not determined, one probable cause was
believed to be excessive competition among firms to offer
lower fees -- but the Cohen Commission was unable to document
this relationship.

4.

Furthermore, the Report (p. 115) stated, "Although

there are other factors, the Commission believes that excessive
time pressures are one of the most pervasive causes of audit
failures."

The Report discussed specific audit practices

that the Cohen Commission believed cause or result from the

(2)

John Grant Rhode, The Independent Auditor's Work
Environment: A Survey, Commission on Auditors'
Responsibilities Research Study No. 4 (New York: AICPA,
1978).
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excessive time pressures.

Those discussions and related

conclusions that are addressed later in this position paper
are summarized in paragraphs 5 through 7.

5.

The Cohen Commission stated that excessive time pressures

are caused in some cases by inappropriate policies and
procedures of firms concerning audit time budgets.

The

budgets have a negative effect on the auditor's performance
if they are unrealistic or if variances from them are used
inappropriately for evaluating personnel performance.
Unrealistic time budgets result from their being established
too low, either from arbitrary decisions or from invalid
information about time spent in the prior year audit because
chargeable hours were underreported.

6.

The Cohen Commission also stated that excessive time

pressures result, in some cases, in the undesirable situations
of inadequately supervised audits and of auditors having
signed for completing audit steps (not covered by another
compensating step) when they had not performed the work.

As

to the former situation, the Cohen Commission believed its
research found that many of the alleged audit failures fit
the general picture of a "partner supervising fifteen or
twenty engagements, many with identical year ends, working
considerable overtime, unable to find adequate time to
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review work papers, and faced with several crucial decisions,
some of which were ultimately made incorrectly" (Report,
page 115).

As to the latter situation, the Cohen Commission

indicated that 58% of respondents to the Rhode Survey who
were still in public practice had at least once in their
career signed for work not performed and that the situation
was the most serious deficiency revealed by the survey, "for
it reflects on the auditor's own control system for the
audit" (Report, p. 116).

7.

With respect to these audit practices, the Cohen

Commission made the following recommendations:

"Public accounting firms should not abandon time budgets,
but they must improve current methods, particularly for
the evaluation of variances and their effect on the
evaluation of personnel....

Any revision of the budgeting

process should include careful consideration of safe
guards to avoid arbitrarily establishing excessively
low budgets because fees have been set too low" (Report,
pp. 117-118).

"Firms [should] immediately undertake to conduct studies
to determine the extent of conditions revealed by the
Commission's study and the effects on their practices"
(Report, p. 118).

110

CONSIDERATION OF COHEN COMMISSION'S CONCLUSIONS

8.

Serious consideration must be given to any indications

that some audits may be performed at a substandard level,
that excessive time and budget pressures may be the cause of
substandard audits, and that inadequate supervision and
improper sign-off practices may result from those pressures
or for any other reasons.

As discussed in the "Task Force

Conclusions and Recommendations" section below, public
accounting firms should take steps to mitigate the possible
effect of any such conditions.

However, the task force

believes that several factors concerning the results of the
Rhode Survey and developments in the profession, which are
discussed in paragraphs 9 through 16, should be considered
in judging the pervasiveness and significance of such
conditions and in determining the appropriate response.

Interpretation Of Rhode Survey Results

9.

The results of the Rhode Survey are subject to a

variety of interpretations regarding the effect of time
pressures on audit quality.

As indicated earlier, the Cohen

Commission's Report (p. 116) stated that 58% of respondents
to the Rhode Survey who were still in public practice answered
"Yes" to the question, "During the course of an audit, have
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you ever signed off a required audit step, not covered by
another audit step, without completing the work or noting
the omission of procedures?"
responses are interesting.

The available details of those
For example, those responses can

be summarized from page 121 of the Rhode Survey report
as follows:

Percentage
of Responses

Choice of Answers Available for the Question
(A respondent was instructed to check
one of the following.)

0.2

Yes, frequently (10 or more times) even though
you were not satisfied with the extent of the
examination in that area

2.9

Yes, infrequently (less than 10 times) even
though you were not satisfied with the extent
of the examination in that area

3.1

[Subtotal]

7.9

Yes, frequently, (10 or more times) although
you were satisfied with the extent of the
examination in that area

46.7

Yes, infrequently (less than 10 times) although
you were satisfied with the extent of the
examination in that area

57.7

[Subtotal -- i.e., the 58% referred to earlier]

42.3

No, never in my auditing experience

100.0

[Total]

As indicated by this summary, only 3.1% of all respondents
(who were still in public practice) had engaged in the
conduct described in the question and were not satisfied
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with the extent of the examination in that area.

Page 121

of the report (2) also indicates that the comparable figure
for those no longer in public practice was 4.3%.

Furthermore,

it would appear from correlated questions in the Survey that
in a substantial number of instances "the omission of required
work was discovered" (Report, pp. 179-180) -- presumably,
discovered in the review process.

10.

The details of the key question discussed in paragraph 9

do raise concerns regarding the adequacy of audit documentation
and the inclusion of unnecessary procedures in audit programs
(that is, overauditing).

However, the task force believes

that those concerns -- although important -- are not so
serious as to imply that a pervasive condition of "substandard
audits" exists where essential audit procedures are being
omitted because of excessive time pressures.

Effects of Developments in the Profession

11.

Certain profession-wide developments have occurred

since the publication of the Cohen Commission's report that
should have the effect of enhancing audit quality:

issuance

of SAS No. 22 on planning and supervision, actions by the
AICPA Division for CPA Firms with related membership require
ments, measures taken by the AICPA to discipline its individual-
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member CPAs, and the inauguration of separate authoritative
pronouncements on quality control standards.

12.

Statement on Auditing Standards No. 22, Planning and

Supervision, was issued in March, 1978.

Generally it discusses,

among other things, the development of an overall strategy
for the expected conduct and scope of an audit, the early
identification of areas that may need special consideration,
and the continuous participation of the partner throughout
the audit.

The task force believes that this SAS should

serve to reduce the possibility of inadequate partner
supervision.

It also should help to increase the information

base from which the audit time budgets are prepared (see
paragraphs 3 and 4 of the SAS).

13.

The AICPA Division for CPA Firms began in 1977 and

continued in 1978 and 1979 to develop its activities and to
make both the SEC Practice Section and the Private Companies
Practice Section fully effective.

This division has provided

the profession an organizational structure through which
regulatory requirements, disciplinary actions, and sanctions
can be imposed on CPA firms.
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14.

The task force believes that two of the SEC Practice

Section's membership requirements, in particular, should
serve to improve audit quality on a profession-wide basis:
the concurring review of a firm's audit reports as to SEC
engagements and the periodic peer review of a firm's quality
controls.

(The Private Companies Practice Section has a

similar membership requirement for periodic peer review.)
Programs developed by the SEC Practice Section and contained
in its Peer Review Manual specifically identify time budgets
and supervision on selected audits as areas that ordinarily
should be subjected to the appropriate peer-review procedures.

15.

In addition to the actions taken to regulate CPA firms,

the AICPA has taken measures to strengthen its effectiveness
in disciplining its individual-member CPAs.

These measures

provide for, among other things, a public accountability of
the ethics committee and trial board with respect to disci
plinary matters, and a continuing review of the entire
disciplinary machinery applicable to the profession to
determine how it can be made more effective.

Several state

boards of accountancy and state societies of CPAs also have
increased their disciplinary activities.
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16.

A newly-formed senior committee of the AICPA issued in

November, 1979 its first Statement on Quality Control Standards
(SQCS) entitled "System of Quality Control for a CPA Firm."
This statement incorporates the elements of quality control
discussed in SAS No. 4, "Quality Control Considerations for
a Firm of Independent Auditors" issued December, 1974, which
date probably was too recent for the statement to have been
adequately reflected in the mid-1976 Rhode Survey.

SQCS No.

1 requires, among other things, that firms have a system to
assure that quality control considerations are addressed,
that the quality control policies and procedures are commu
nicated to the firms' personnel, and that the system is
monitored.

Furthermore, in 1978, examples were provided by

a special committee to illustrate the types of policies and
procedures that firms might establish for each element of
quality control specified in SAS No. 4 and later incorporated
into SQCS No. 1 (see AICPA Professional Standards, Volume 2,
QC Section 200, "Quality Control Policies and Procedures for
Participating CPA Firms").
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TASK FORCE CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

17.

Competition among firms and time pressures on audits

necessarily exist because public accounting firms operate in
a business environment similar to that of the firms they
audit.

Thus, the firms' operational goals of growth and

profitability may at times appear to conflict with goals
relating to quality of work.

However, the task force believes

there is not persuasive evidence that firms have sacrificed
quality.

More specifically, based primarily on the consider

ations discussed in paragraphs 9 through 16, the task force
believes that the Cohen Commission's concerns about inadequate
supervision and improper sign-off practices are not as
serious or pervasive as some apparently have inferred from
its Report.

Most importantly, the task force believes there

are pervasive positive forces at work on audit quality and
specifically on the Cohen Commission's concerns -- those
forces resulting from the effects of developments in the
profession described in paragraphs 11 through 16.

18.

The need to balance apparently conflicting goals requires

firms to establish, clearly and decisively, their goals for
quality of work.

Also, the fact that inappropriate audit

practices were identified to any extent by the Cohen Commission
emphasizes that firms should be watchful to determine that
their quality goals are in fact being achieved.
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Accordingly,

firms should continue to reassess, and otherwise monitor the
effectiveness of, their policies and procedures concerning
the use of audit time budgets, the level of audit partner
supervision, and the signing off for audit work.

The task

force believes that this reassessment and monitoring of
certain aspects of the auditor's work environment should be
made in order to reduce, to the lowest possible level, the
types of concerns discussed in paragraphs 4 through 6.

In

making the reassessment, firms should consider the matters
discussed in paragraphs 19 through 22; and in otherwise
monitoring the effectiveness of their prescribed policies
and procedures, firms should consider the matters discussed
in paragraphs 23 through 25.

19.

Firms should communicate to their personnel the objectives

of the time-budgeting process and should indicate that audit
time budgets should be realistic and kept in proper perspective
in evaluating personnel performance.

Firms also should

communicate a policy of not permitting excessively low
budgets to be arbitrarily established.

Furthermore, such

communication should establish procedures for the preparation
and use of audit time budgets, and for the appropriate
recording of audit time spent, in order that excessive time
pressures are not created.

Comments

in the Report (p. 117)

on time budgets might be useful to firms in developing or
revising such communication.
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20.

As indicated in SAS No. 22, the extent of partner

supervision appropriate in a given instance depends on many
factors, including the complexity of the audit and the
qualifications of the persons performing the work.

Therefore,

in addition to having established policies and procedures
concerning the nature, timing and extent of partner supervision
of audits, firms should plan for and maintain adequate
numbers of supervisory personnel.

21.

The signing off for a required audit procedure without

completing the work or noting the omission of the procedure
is undesirable and unacceptable behavior.

This is true even

where an individual believes that the procedure is not
necessary, is covered by another procedure, or for any other
reason.

In order that the partner and other supervisors can

make audit decisions based on reliable information, firms
should provide guidance to their personnel on, generally,
the form and content of working papers and, specifically,
the proper procedures for signing off for (or otherwise
indicating) work performed and the appropriate manner for
noting a change in the planned procedure or a decision not
to perform the procedure.
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22.

The specific form and extent of communications to

firms' employees -- that provide guidance on audit time
budgets, partner supervision, and sign-off practices -- will
vary depending on the size, structure, and nature of practice
of the firms.

For example, some firms might decide that a

portion of an employee code of conduct, containing strong
admonitions, might be the appropriate means to set forth the
responsibilities of each professional in the firm with
respect to those matters.

Such firms also might decide to

request a confirmation from each professional as to compliance
with the code of conduct.

Alternatively, some firms might

decide that periodic meetings of their professionals, in
which those matters are discussed, would be equally effective.

23.

Firms also should continue to monitor the effectiveness

of their prescribed policies and procedures concerning the
three matters discussed earlier (audit time budgets, partner
supervision, and sign-off practices) and to determine whether
any modifications thereto are required.

The task force

believes that feedback from firms' employees to the partners
concerning those three matters would provide useful information
for such monitoring activities.

24.

The feedback discussed in paragraph 23 might be obtained

through various means that ordinarily exist already within
firms.

Those means, for example, might include:

120

On-the-job supervision, during the performance of the
audit, as part of which discussions are held with firm
employees and observations of audit conduct are made by
supervisory personnel.

Procedures, required by SAS No. 22, for resolving any
significant differences of opinion among firm personnel
concerning accounting and auditing issues on the audit.

A debriefing session held at the conclusion of the
audit and attended by the key members of the audit
team.

The firm's inspection program required by SQCS No. 1.

Periodic counseling sessions for each employee of the
firm.

25.

Each of the activities listed in paragraph 24 would not

necessarily provide employee feedback on one or all of the
three matters discussed earlier.

The task force believes,

however, that a combination of those activities listed -- or
others not shown -- can provide a firm such feedback that is
sufficient in relation to the firm's overall monitoring
activities, its size, structure, and nature of its practice.
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26.

Accordingly, the task force does not believe that a

firm needs to conduct an internal survey to obtain feedback
with respect to the auditor's work environment in the firm;
however, some firms might decide to do so.

The recommendations

in paragraphs 18 through 25 apply to a firm regardless of
whether it performed an internal survey.

Therefore, a firm

might proceed, without performing an internal survey, to
implement the above-discussed recommendations as appropriate -based on, among other things, an assessment of the effectiveness
of prescribed policies and procedures that address the
concerns expressed by the Cohen Commission.
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